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I. INTRODUCTION
A person's liability for the debts his or her spouse was once an in-
variable attribute of marital status. Two individual persons merged
into one legal persona. The husband managed the legal persona and
acted as the exclusive agent for both spouses., Today, marriage is
© Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW.
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1. 1 SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 433-45
(William Carey Jones ed., 1915). In his commentaries, Blackstone noted that:
By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law: that is, the
very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the mar-
riage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the hus-
band: under whose wing, protection, and cover, she performs everything;
and is therefore called in our law-French a feme-covert, foemina viro co-
operta [married woman]; is said to be covert-baron, or under the protec-
tion and influence of her husband, her baron, or lord; and her condition
during her marriage is called her coverture.
Id. at 442.
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more like partnership than merger. 2 Married persons hold property
and incur liability together but also remain distinct individuals. A
spouse may incur liability on her own behalf or as an agent for the
other.
In many situations, whether a married person is financially re-
sponsible for her spouse's debt is a simple question of personal liabil-
ity under contract or other law. Suppose one spouse wants to buy a
motorcycle on credit. If the other spouse co-signs the loan, both
spouses are directly liable to the creditor, even though only one of
them rides the motorcycle and even though they think of the loan as
solely his responsibility. In some situations, one spouse becomes lia-
ble for the other not by consent but rather by imputation. Suppose a
married person defrauds a business associate and becomes liable in
tort. If the tortfeasor acted as agent for the other spouse or on behalf
of their marital partnership, then the other spouse is liable by
imputation.
Consider what is at stake in imputed marital liability cases. Impu-
tation spreads liability from one spouse to both. The pool of assets
available to satisfy the creditor's claim also expands to include the
other spouse's property.3 This expansion is important when the di-
rectly liable person is insolvent.4 The other spouse and the creditor
both have a powerful argument against the debtor that they should
not be responsible for his conduct. But his insolvency inescapably re-
quires one of them to bear it.5 If the other spouse loses her property to
2. See 1 ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, BROMBERG AND RIBSTEIN ON PART-
NERSHIP § 1.03 (Aspen Publishers 1998 & Supp. 2007); MILTON C. REGAN, JR.,
ALONE TOGETHER: LAW AND THE MEANINGS OF MARRIAGE 12 (Oxford Univ. Press
1999) ("[M]arriage is but a particularly stark example of a setting in which we
seek both preservation of individuality and commitment to a shared purpose that
transcends the self."). The analogy between marriage and partnership is imper-
fect in many respects. A marriage is not an entity distinct from the individuals.
Under modem law, whether a partnership is a distinct legal entity or an 'aggre-
gate' of individual partners is an open question. See BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN,
supra, § 1.03(a) (noting that "the courts have been unable to agree on the appro-
priate characterization of partnership").
3. See generally Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Or-
ganizational Law, 110 YALE L.J. 387, 393 (2000) (noting that establishing the
legal distinction between individual and group is the principal role of organiza-
tional law).
4. The task of allocating loss from one actor's default and insolvency among relative
innocents is the bulwark of organizational and commercial law. See generally
JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 839-83 (5th
ed. 2000) (describing UCC Article 9 rules regarding priority conflicts among cred-
itors). Cf. Marie T. Reilly, Making Sense of Successor Liability, 31 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 745 (2003) (successor liability law); Marie T. Reilly, The Latent Efficiency of
Fraudulent Transfer Law, 57 LA. L. REV. 1213, 1234-45 (1997) [hereinafter La-
tent Efficiency] (fraudulent transfer law).
5. The risk that the primarily liable party may default while insolvent and exter-
nalize loss illustrates the economic problem of moral hazard. See, e.g., Mark V.
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the creditor, she acquires a right of reimbursement against the insol-
vent spouse and his insolvency becomes her problem. On the other
hand, a finding that a directly liable spouse acted solely as an individ-
ual protects the other spouse and her assets from risk of loss to his
creditor. His creditor ends up with all the loss while the other spouse
bears none.
Under what circumstances should one spouse's liability be the
other spouse's problem? Today, married people can to some extent set
the scope of their shared marital enterprise and their financial re-
sponsibility for each other by agreement. 6 Imputed liability, however,
is a legal construct imposed on the couple without their consent, at a
creditor's request. It is generally beyond the couple's power to control
by private agreement. 7
This Article explores the historical and modern role of marital
agency law in defining a critical aspect of what it means to be mar-
ried-the scope of spouses' imputed liability for each other to third
parties. Part II explains how the emergence in the nineteenth century
of married women's legal capacity was driven in part by demand for a
reliable legal mechanism to shield assets invested in marriage from
the claims of husbands' creditors. Part III considers the scope of mari-
tal agency and shared liability under the modern view of marriage as
a voluntary partnership among equals, terminable at the will of ei-
ther. Spouses' financial responsibility for each other to third parties
varies widely among jurisdictions. The variety reflects differences in
spousal property rights among marital community and non-commu-
nity property regimes. It also reveals the absence of a consistent the-
ory of the scope of shared risk and reward relative to spouses'
individuality within marriage. Part IV offers an explanation for the
persistent complexity of the law governing creditors' rights against
married people. Even in the context of divorce, in which the partner-
ship metaphor is most robust, we lack consensus on the legal effect of
Pauly, The Economics of Moral Hazard: Comment, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 531, 535
(1968).
6. See generally Brian H. Bix, The ALI Principles and Agreements: Seeking a Bal-
ance Between Status and Contract, in RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY: CRITIQUE ON
THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE'S PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSLOUTION
372-91 (Robin Fretwell Wilson ed., 2006) (contrasting the ALI Principles' treat-
ment of premarital, marital and separation agreements with current law); Brian
Bix, Bargaining in the Shadow of Love: The Enforcement of Premarital Agree-
ments and How We Think About Marriage, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 145, 148-58
(1998) (summarizing history of enforceability of pre-marital agreements).
7. E.g, Jansen v. U.S., No. CV-S-90-253-RDF(RJJ), 1992 WL 121368, at *2 (D. Nev.
Feb. 4, 1992) (agreement couple executed after marriage excluding husband's
earnings from community property was effective only between the spouses and
not against the IRS as wife's creditor). But see Calmes v. U.S., 926 F. Supp. 582,
588 (N.D. Tex. 1996) (prenuptial agreement recharacterizing spouses' income
from community to separate property was effective against IRS).
2008]
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marriage on a couple's legal relationship with each other. This void
complicates not only divorce but also the related question of the scope
of spouses' shared responsibility to third party creditors during their
marriage. Despite the daunting complexity of marital agency law, it is
a mirror of judicial and legislative attitudes about the balance be-
tween public and private regulation of intimate relationships. And, it
is an undeniably powerful instrument of social policy.
II. THE EFFECT OF MARRIED WOMEN'S PROPERTY
REFORM ON CREDITORS' RIGHTS AGAINST
MARRIED PEOPLE
Until reform in the nineteenth century, marriage created an aggre-
gate of two individuals dominated by one of them. Under this theory
of marital unity, the husband owned and controlled nearly all the
couple's wealth.8 As a legal and practical matter, married women
were isolated from market activity. Without legal capacity or property
of their own, married women were hardly worth creditors' attention.
Only husbands could become liable to a creditor. Creditors enjoyed
recourse to the full extent of his property, which included interests he
acquired from his wife by virtue of marriage.
Although, in theory, a married woman lacked legal capacity as an
individual, 9 she existed as a legal person for some purposes. She
could act as an agent for herself and her husband in emergencies, such
as "when her husband [was] imprisoned for life or for years, or [had]
fled the country or been exiled." 1o Moreover, married women enjoyed
derivative legal capacity as retail consumers. A married woman could
bind her husband and the wealth he controlled by a contract for
"necessaries" as if he had incurred the obligation directly."1 To recon-
cile the legal construct of marital unity of person with the doctrine of
necessaries, courts commonly explained a husband's indirect liability
for necessaries as a corollary of a husband's common law duty to sup-
8. See 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 129 (2d ed. 1832); e.g., Gris-
wold v. Penniman, 2 Conn. 564, 564 (1818) ("It is a general rule, that all personal
property, which accrues to the wife during coverture, vests absolutely in the hus-
band. The reason is, that the legal existence of the wife is merged in that of her
husband."). See generally MARYLYNN SALMON, WOMEN AND THE LAW OF PROP-
ERTY IN EARLY AMERICA, chs. 5-6 (1986).
9. E.g., 5 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 11:2 (Richard
Lord ed., 4th ed. 1993).
10. Bank v. Partee, 99 U.S. 325, 330 (1878).
11. See generally Phillips, Nizer, Benjamin, Krim & Ballon v. Rosenstiel, 490 F.2d
509, 517 (2d Cir. 1973) (discussing doctrine of necessaries under common law);
WILLISTON, supra note 9, § 11:9; Robert C. Brown, The Duty of the Husband to
Support the Wife, 18 VA. L. REV. 823, 823-26 (1932) (discussing the duty of the
husband to the wife under the principles of the law of agency).
[Vol. 87:373
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port his wife.12 A wife's legal agency for her husband lurked unmis-
takably. Whether a particular debt was for "necessaries" depended on
the economic circumstances and expectations of the particular couple,
rather than an inflexible standard based on wives' minimal expecta-
tion of support.13
During the early nineteenth century, social and economic change
became a dominant theme in Americans' lives. 14 Families increas-
ingly encountered entrepreneurial and tort liability, presenting a
range and magnitude of risk far greater than consumer debt for neces-
saries. 15 The wage labor force grew and families grew increasingly
dependent on income without the safety net of a real property portfo-
lio. Change in the type and level of risk facing families affected their
12. E.g., Gessler v. Gessler, 124 A.2d 502, 505 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1956) (indicating that a
husband's duty to support his family justified implication of obligation to creditor
who extended necessaries to wife).
13. E.g., Raynes v. Bennett, 114 Mass. 424, 429 (1874) (".[T]he term 'necessaries'...
is not confined to food or clothing required to sustain life ... but includes such
articles of utility as are suitable to maintain [the wife] according to the estate and
degree of her husband.").
14. See generally LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 148 (3d ed.
2005) (By the mid-nineteenth century, "[tihe number of women with a stake in
the economy had increased dramatically."); MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE
HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 6 (1985)
(describing factors that "marked the crucial transition of the family from a public
to private institution" including a shift in family economics from production to
consumption, decline of generational influences, new fertility patterns and de-
clining family size, emerging domestic egalitarianism as a challenge to patri-
mony, and "a more clearly defined use of private property as the major source of
domestic autonomy"); DAVID J. Russo, FAMILIES AND COMMUNITIES: A NEW VIEW
OF AMERICAN HISTORY 4 (1974) (noting that changes occurred economically, so-
cially, politically, and culturally); AMY DRu STANLEY, FROM BONDAGE TO CON-
TRACT: WAGE LABOR, MARRIAGE AND THE MARKET IN THE AGE OF SLAVE
EMANCIPATION 186-88 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1998) (describing postbellum in-
tersection of marital reform movement and free labor economy); John H.
Langbein, The Twentieth-Century Revolution in Family Wealth Transmission, 86
MICH. L. REV. 722, 722-24 (1988). For a discussion of the impact of this economic
change on contract law, see Walter F. Pratt, Jr., American Contract Law at the
Turn of the Century, 39 S.C. L. REV. 415 (1988).
15. See, e.g., NORMA BASCH, IN THE EVES OF THE LAW: WOMEN, MARRIAGE AND PROP-
ERTY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY NEW YORK 39 (1982) ("The world of husbands and
wives in antebellum New York was far removed from the agricultural world of
baron and feme in medieval England. New Yorkers lived amidst an intricate net-
work of speculation, credit, insurance, stocks, and wages which was subject to
cycles of boom and bust."); see STUART BRUCHEY, GROWTH OF THE MODERN AMERI-
CAN ECONOMY 102-03 (1975); see also Claire Priest, Creating an American Prop-
erty Law: Alienability and its Limits in American History, 120 HARv. L. REV. 385
(2006) (analyzing laws protecting real property from the claims of creditors in
colonial America).
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
economic organization in a way that made change in marital law
inevitable. 16
At the time, however, marital law was highly inflexible. Under the
Blackstonian theory of marriage as merger, a husband could incur
debt only as an agent for his marriage and not as an individual. 17 Nor
could he easily segregate "marital" wealth into a distinct asset pool
shielded from risk of loss from his creditors. Married couples needed a
low cost, accessible, and reliable way for one of them to take risk with-
out exposing all their wealth to creditors.
The first response was judicial. Courts recognized limited, equita-
ble property rights for married women as a means of segregating fam-
ily wealth from the husband's creditors. By the beginning of the
nineteenth century, a couple with legal advice could opt-out of a pro-
spective husband's marital prerogative over a wife's property rights by
conveyance of property (typically by her father or her husband) to her
"separate estate" established via an express or implied trust for her
benefit.' 8 Even without agreement between the spouses, in response
to foreclosure, some courts reserved a priority equitable interest for a
married woman in personal property she owned prior to, or inherited
during, marriage.19 The sole purpose of recognizing priority for a
16. See Isidor Loeb, The Legal Property Relations of Married Parties: A Study In
Comparative Legislation in 13 STUDIES IN HISTORY, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC LAW
11, 12 (Faculty of Pol. Sci. of Columbia Univ. ed., 1900) ("The changes in the
industrial system had affected the economic organization of the family, and it
was inevitable that the legal relations [of husband and wife] should accommodate
themselves to the new conditions."). Historian Lawrence Friedman noted that in
England, the common law was geared to the landed gentry but in mid-nineteenth
century United States, "the middle-class family was at the core of the law" and
English land-based legal regimes were "too cumbersome, technical, and expen-
sive for this class to use or tolerate." FRIEDMAN, supra note 14, at 148.
17. See 1 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MARRIAGE AND DI-
VORCE §§ 2-19 (Little, Brown, & Co. 1873) (observing that executed contract of
marriage is in part contract and in part status; parties could contract to order
their property interests within their marriage as the requisite consideration, but
could not alter the status conferred on them by marriage).
18. E.g., Butler v. Merchants Ins. Co., 8 Ala. 146, 152 (1845); Ancker v. Levy, 22 S.C.
Eq. 197 (3 Strob. Eq. 1849). See generally JOHN F. KELLY, A TREATISE ON THE
LAW OF CONTRACTS OF MARRIED WOMEN 2-25 (1882) (describing ante-nuptial con-
tracts and trusts).
19. Unlike interests in real property, her husband did not automatically acquire title
to such personal property by marriage. Rather, he took title only upon "reducing
it to his possession." No husband could physically possess intangible property
rights (such as a contract right to rent or interest income). So, courts adopted a
requirement that a husband could reduce such property to his control only via a
judicial proceeding in which courts typically imposed equitable trust for the wife.
E.g., Shaw v. Mitchell, 21 F. Cas. 1195, 1197 (D. Me. 1843) (No. 12,722); Tevis's
Representatives v. Richardson's Heirs, 23 Ky. (7 T.B. Mon.) 654 (1828). See Leo-
nard J. Long, Emerging from the Shadow: The Bankrupt's Wife in Nineteenth-
Century America, 21 QUINNIPiAc L. REV. 489, 517-22 (2002) (describing equitable
doctrine that elevated a married woman's property interests over those of her
[Vol. 87:373
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wife's equitable interest in property was to protect it from seizure by
the husband's creditors. A married woman continued to have no legal
right to manage any property, including property attributed to a trust
for her benefit, except as provided expressly in the trust.2 0
The manipulation of property rights to protect some of a married
couple's property interests from market risk was not a new idea.2 1 In
the colonial period, some American jurisdictions had adopted the En-
glish common law joint marital estate, tenancy by the entirety, as a
device for segregating family wealth from the claims of creditors. 22
Blackstone explained that because husband and wife were one person
under the law, they could not hold property jointly in a true concur-
rent estate, but only "by the entireties."23 The wealth-shielding effect
of estate by the entirety is analogous to that of an equitable separate
estate. A husband cannot alienate or encumber it unilaterally. Nor
could a creditor of only one spouse partition property held by the en-
tirety by foreclosure during the other spouse's life without her con-
sent.2 4 Later, during the nineteenth century, political opposition to
husband and his creditors). Courts explained the priority of the wife's equitable
interest as an expression of the moral imperative of the husband's marital duty to
support his wife. "For he holds [marital property], not in his personal, but in his
representative character, and, like every other administrator, is bound to account
for it to those who are legally or equitably entitled to it." Shaw, 21 F. Cas. at
1197.
20. E.g., Trs. of the Methodist Episcopal Church v. Jaques, 3 Johns Ch. 77, 88 (N.Y.
Ch. 1817), in which the court stated that:
These marriage settlements are made to secure to the wife, and her off-
spring, a certain support in every event, and to guard her against being
overwhelmed by the misfortunes, or unkindness, or vices, of the hus-
band. They usually proceed from the prudence and foresight of friends,
or the warm and anxious affection of parents. If fairly made, they ought
to be supported, according to the true intent and spirit of the instrument
by which they are created ....
21. See generally Priest, supra note 15 (analyzing economic and political development
of colonial American law governing non-family creditors' rights in debtors' real
property).
22. See generally John V. Orth, Tenancy by the Entirety: The Strange Career of the
Common-Law Marital Estate, 1997 BYU L. REV. 35.
23. Id. at 38-39. "Both husband and wife were seised of the entirety .... Id. at 39.
England abolished tenancy by the entireties in 1925. See Law of Property Act,
1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 20, § 39(6) (Eng.) in LAW OF PROPERTY ACT, 1925, 25
(W.H. Aggs & H.W. Law eds., 1925) (converting tenancies by the entirety into
joint tenancies).
24. 4 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, THOMPSON EDITION § 33.02 (partition), § 33.07(e)
(creditors' rights) (David A. Thomas, ed., 1994); 41 AM. JuR. 2D Husband and
Wife § 32 (partition), § 36 (liability for debt) (2005 & Supp. 2008). A creditor tech-
nically can seize the debtor/spouse's interest but only subject to the other spouse's
indestructible right of survivorship. This encumbrance practically eliminates, or
at least greatly diminishes, the market value of the debtor's interest. For a mod-
em critique, see Steve R. Johnson, The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly in Post-Drye
Tax Lien Analysis, 5 FLA. TAx REV. 415, 441-42 (2002) (describing how tenancy
by the entirety jurisdictions treat creditors' claims against one spouse).
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commodification of real property rights led to homestead legislation to
protect real property from the claims of non-family creditors.2 5
As nineteenth century economy exposed families to unprecedented
risk of liability, marital law made married women entirely dependent
on their husbands. At the same time, their social and legal status ren-
dered them impotent to monitor or control their husbands' disposition
of family resources. 26 Courts openly protected married women's right
to financial support as morally superior to husbands' creditors' claims
as an appropriate intervention into market relationships over which
wives had no control. 27 To creditors, however, courts' solicitude for
wives' financial security appeared as a populist maneuver that sub-
orned fraud, undermined commerce, and preserved a bygone social
order.
By the middle of the nineteenth century, judge-made law gov-
erning creditors' rights against married people and their property was
a labyrinth. 28 Calls for clarity fueled political support for marital
property reform legislation.29 One historian notes that although the
25. E.g., Doyle v. Coburn, 88 Mass. (6 Allen) 71 (1863) (homestead is a limited estate
that cannot be conveyed by the sole deed of a husband). Richard Chused has
observed that the appearance of homestead statutes was roughly contemporane-
ous with married women's property reform legislation. Richard H. Chused, Mar-
ried Women's Property Law: 1800-1850, 71 GEO. L.J. 1359, 1398-1404 (1983).
See generally Alison D. Morantz, There's No Place Like Home: Homestead Exemp-
tion and Judicial Construction of Family in Nineteenth-Century America, 24 LAw
& HIST. REV. 245 (2006); Priest, supra note 15, at 421-27 (describing the Debt
Recovery Act as a means of protecting creditors' investment in the American colo-
nies from the effect of British law that made real property exempt from creditors'
recourse).
26. Joan C. Williams, Married Women and Property, 1 VA. J. SoC. POL'Y & L. 383,
386-87 (1994) (noting plight of abandoned wives in industrial economy under
coverture).
27. See, e.g., Elliott v. Waring, 21 Ky. (5 T.B. Mon.) 338, 340 (1827), in which the
court noted that:
While it is necessary for family government, and also to the relation to
the rest of society, in which the husband and wife may stand, that there
should be but one will to govern, and one owner of property, yet there are
great abuses as well as hardships growing out of that rule, which courts
of law can not correct, or relieve, and equity therefore will interpose, and
give redress. One of these hardships is the suffering of the wife and chil-
dren, from the imprudence of the husband, and equity will often relieve
it, by providing for the maintenance of the wife, especially out of an es-
tate originally belonging to her in her own right.
28. A court noted with understatement that the validity of implied or expressed
trusts for the benefit of married women against husbands' creditors was a matter
of "considerable nicety." In re Grant, 10 F. Cas. 973, 975 (D. Mass. 1842) (No.
5,693); see also Reva B. Siegel, The Modernization of Marital Status Law: Adjudi-
cating Wives' Rights to Earnings 1860-1930, 82 GEO. L.J. 2127, 2142 (1994)
("Courts vacillating between protection of family assets and protection of creditor
interests developed a conflict-riddled law of capacity destined for collapse.").
29. See BASCH, supra note 15, at 115 (lobbyist for married women's property reform
in New York in the 1830's noted that reform would enable couples to shield some
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reform movement appeared to advance the legal capacity and property
rights of married women, "the main point... [was] to rationalize more
mundane, even cold-blooded matters, such as the rights of a creditor
to collect debts out of land owned by husbands, wives, or both."30 An-
other historian explains the reform movement as a "complex interplay
of factors."31 Hope of reducing uncertainty regarding marital wealth-
shielding techniques on the developing credit market "assured its pas-
sage."32 Married women's property legislation in the first half of the
nineteenth century coincided with periods of economic depression,
which also suggests a political connection between reform and the eco-
nomic prospects of middle class families. 33 By the end of the Civil
War, twenty-nine states had enacted legislation recognizing the ca-
pacity of a married woman to hold legal title to property separately
from her husband and his creditors.3 4 The immediate effect was to
make it easier for a married couple to segregate property from foreclo-
sure by creditors, and to reduce uncertainty in credit markets about
the state of title to property.
Married women's separate estate became an effective wealth shield
against creditors who could not (or did not) bargain with the couple in
of their assets from their creditors); Joseph A. Ranney, Anglicans, Merchants,
and Feminists: A Comparative Study of the Evolution of Married Women's Rights
in Virginia, New York and Wisconsin, 6 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 493, 554
(2000) (concluding that in all three states, reform was enacted principally as a
means of protecting assets from husband's creditors).
30. FRIEDMAN, supra note 14, at 148. During constitutional debates in 1850 on a
California community property provision, delegates argued that a wife's separate
estate violated the laws of nature and would injure creditors by allowing hus-
bands to hide their assets in their wives separate estates. See J. BROWNE, RE-
PORT OF THE DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION OF CALIFORNIA ON THE FORMATION OF
THE STATE CONSTITUTION IN SEPTEMBER AND OCTOBER, 1849, at 262 (remarks of
Del. Lippitt) and, at 268-69 (remarks of Del. Botts) (1850), discussed in Judith T.
Younger, Marital Regimes: A Story of Compromise and Demoralization, Together
with Criticism and Suggestions for Reform, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 45, 54 (1981).
31. Linda E. Speth, The Married Women's Property Acts, 1839-1865: Reform, Reac-
tion, or Revolution? in 2 WOMEN AND THE LAW 69, 75 (D. Kelly Weisberg ed.,
1982); see id. at 73-75 for a discussion of the factors.
32. Id.; see also Siegel, supra note 28, at 2136 (describing historical accounts of the
"competing preoccupations driving reform" as "matters of land law, debtor-credi-
tor relations, family welfare, codification and capital accumulation" and conclud-
ing that "considerations of gender equity play[ed] a conspicuously minor role").
33. BASCH, supra note 15, at 113-35; Speth, supra note 31, at 73.
34. See Norma Basch, Invisible Women: The Legal Fiction of Marital Unity in Nine-
teenth-Century America, 5 FEMINIST STUD. 346 (1979); Speth, supra note 31, at
73-74. Mississippi law was the first to pass married women's property legisla-
tion. It protected slaves a wife held before or inherited during marriage from
attachment by her husband's creditors. 1839 Miss. Laws ch. 46. See generally
Chused, supra note 25, 1409-10 (describing two forms of married women's prop-
erty statutes, the first recognizing a separate estate for married women at law,
and the second merely insulating certain property designated as married wo-
men's separate estate from a husband's creditors).
2008]
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advance for the personal liability of both. Note that creditors who can
bargain can contract with both spouses and eliminate the risk of a loss
from a subsequent inter-marital property transfer from the debtor
spouse to the other spouse. For example, a home mortgage lender can
insist on the personal liability of both spouses and recourse to their
respective interests in the real property collateral as a condition to the
credit. Or, a creditor can set interest rates to take the risk of ex post
marital wealth-shielding into account. Married women's property re-
form changed the playing field for tax and tort creditors and certain
holders of entrepreneurial debt who did not bargain for shared liabil-
ity in advance. These creditors previously enjoyed automatic access to
all of a married couple's wealth simply by asserting personal liability
of the husband. Reform made it easier for married couples to shield
some wealth from creditors by private allocation to the wife's separate
estate.
Creditors affected by reform responded by challenging inter-mari-
tal property transfers as fraudulent. Fraudulent transfer law quickly
became as complicated and uncertain of outcome as the equitable
property doctrines that reform had laid to rest. For example, some
jurisdictions treated a gift of property from a husband to wife as
though it were made "in consideration of marriage." The legal effect
was to turn a wife from a donee transferee into a purchaser for value,
and to blunt the husband's creditors from avoiding the transfer on
fraudulent transfer grounds.3 5 Some states recognized inter-marital
gift transfers as presumptively non-fraudulent so long as the trans-
feror/husband was not insolvent at the time of the transfer. 36 Others,
35. See, e.g., Prewit v. Wilson, 103 U.S. 22, 23 (1880) (grantor's creditors cannot set
aside post-nuptial conveyance from husband to wife where wife knew husband
was indebted but not to what extent, and without knowledge of his fraudulent
intent); Otis v. Spencer, 102 Ill. 622, 630 (1882), in which the court indicated
that:
While the law is vigilant in protecting creditors against the fraud of their
debtors, it never despoils or confiscates the property of innocent purchas-
ers for their benefit. Such purchasers have the same right of protection
in their rights as have creditors, and it must be remembered that Mrs.
Spencer is entitled to the same protection as had she been a cash pur-
chaser, and had paid every dollar the property was worth.
But see Dent v. Pickens, 33 S.E. 303, 308 (W. Va. 1899) (evidence established that
grantee knew of grantor's fraudulent intent where man conveyed all his property
to his intended wife while a third party's suit against him for breach of promise to
marry was pending).
36. E.g., Cameron v. Peoples' Bank of Maytown, 147 A. 657 (Pa. 1929). The key fact
became the husband's insolvency at the time of the transfer. See Rundle v. Mur-
gatroyd's Assignees, 4 U.S. (1 Dall.) 304 (1804) (invalidating mortgage executed
to wife, which was ostensibly to secure his antecedent obligation to her, as hus-
band was insolvent at the time of the conveyance); Kipp v. Hanna, 2 Bland 26,
34-35 (Md. 1820) (invalidating transfer of couple's home from husband to trust
for benefit of wife while insolvent).
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including New York, followed the contrary English rule, which held
that any gift transfer by a person who was indebted at the time of the
transfer was fraudulent as to existing and subsequent creditors, even
though he did not become insolvent until later.37
Meanwhile, lawyers, courts and legislatures were mired in the un-
intended consequences of married women's property reform. 38 In a
second wave of reform in the post-Civil War period, legislatures clari-
fied an aspect of married women's legal individuality by recognizing a
married woman's right to control wages she earned for work outside
the home. 39 Proponents of married women's wage legislation argued
that it extended to working class married women the financial secur-
ity separate estate legislation afforded women in wealthy marriages.
Income a married woman earned outside the home could afford her
economic security against her husband's creditors.40 One commenta-
tor has noted that courts interpreting wage legislation excluded the
value of services a married woman provided for her family from the
scope of 'wages' subject to her control. A woman's work in her home
was her marital duty and the value of such work continued to be her
husband's property as an incident of marital status.4 1 For wives who
did not own property before marriage, acquire it by gift or inheritance
during marriage, or work outside the home, this second wave of re-
form legislation provided a victory in principle but little protection
against husbands' improvidence or indifference.
Legal recognition of married women's property rights focused cred-
itors' attention on the boundary between individuality and marital
partnership that the unity model of marriage had long obscured. A
profound hypocrisy appeared between property and marital law. Title
to property was a matter of individuality, whereas control of property
was a matter of marital status. Some early reform legislation did not
address at all a married woman's legal capacity to control her separate
property or incur obligation on the strength of it, perhaps supporting
the inference that legislatures expected reform to have no effect on
marriage. For example, New York passed legislation in 1848 that at-
37. Bibb v. Freeman, 59 Ala. 612, 615-16 (1877) (voluntary conveyances by debtor
are void); Reade v. Livingtson, 3 Johns. Ch. 481, 492 (N.Y. 1818) (a gift transfer
by a person who is indebted although not insolvent is presumptively fraudulent).
See generally Annotation, Conveyance Pursuant to Antenuptial Agreement as
Fraud on Creditors, 41 A.L.R. 1163 (1926).
38. See Siegel, supra note 28, at 2142 (describing the aftermath of early married wo-
men's property reform as "commercial havoc").
39. See generally id. at 2145. E.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-912 (1948); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 26.16.130 (West 1961).
40. Siegel, supra note 28, at 2145.
41. Id. at 2129-30. "In this way, courts reformulated a putatively feudal body of sta-
tus law so that the doctrine of marital service imposed upon the wife the duty to
perform such work as is necessary to reproduce the labor force in a modern indus-
trial economy." Id. at 2130.
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tributed legal title to separate property to a wife but failed to recog-
nize her legal agency to transfer such property. Until correction of the
legal glitch, neither spouse could sell the property.4 2
Even after reform, marriage not only stripped a woman of her right
to control property, it obscured her control of and responsibility for
herself. Under pre-reform common law, a married woman could com-
mit a tort, but her husband was liable for it. His liability followed
logically from the construct of marriage as a unity of persons and the
husband's marital dominion over her person and her property.4 3 His
personal liability for her tort was ordained by marital status, not
agency law. His personal liability and wealth provided the sole source
of the tort victim's compensation for injury she caused.44
Reform recognized married women's capacity to hold title to prop-
erty and opened the corollary possibility that married women might
also incur liability as individuals. The possibility became a thorny
practical and theoretical problem in tort cases involving married wo-
men defendants. To the extent that reform legislation addressed
spouses' liability for each other's torts at all, it relieved husbands'
from their marital liability for wives' torts.45 Some statutes omitted
from the husband's newfound freedom from marital tort liability
"case[s] where [the husband] would be jointly responsible with [the
wife] if the marriage did not exist."46 Other statutes defined the scope
of a husband's post-reform liability by implicitly rejecting the prevail-
42. Speth, supra note 31, at 78.
43. E.g., Lane v. Bryant, 37 S.W. 584, 585 (Ky. 1896) (At common law, his marital
right of control "vest[ed] in him the right to use such forcible means as would
bridle her tongue or make her of good behavior.").
44. E.g., Prentiss v. Paisley, 7 So. 56 (Fla. 1889) (indicating that a "[husband's] liabil-
ity for her torts is a result of the mere fact that by the common-law rules a suit
cannot be maintained against the wife alone during coverture"). California, a
community property jurisdiction, adopted this view as to spousal tort liability.
See, e.g., Henley v. Wilson, 70 P. 21 (Cal. 1902). See generally Annotation, Liabil-
ity of Husband for Independent Tort of Wife, 20 A.L.R. 528 (1922) (describing stat-
utory developments rejecting the common law rule of spousal liability). Cf
Adams v. Golson, 174 So. 876, 879 (La. 1937) (rejecting common law liability of
husband for wife's torts except upon proof that "she was expressly or impliedly
authorized to and was, at the time of the commission of the act, actually attend-
ing to the affairs or business of the community").
45. E.g., McCabe v. Berge, 89 Ind. 225, 228 (1882); Hill v. Duncan, 110 Mass. 238
(1872); Bretzfelder v. Demaree, 130 N.E. 505, 506 (Ohio 1921) ("Neither husband
nor wife ... is answerable for the acts of the other."); Bebout v. Pense, 150 N.W.
289, 290 (S.D. 1914) (stating that while the language of the statute relieves the
husband and wife "of liability for the acts of each other, it does not purport to
relieve them as individuals . . . ").
46. E.g., McElroy v. Capron, 54 A. 44, 45 (R.I. 1902) (under Rhode Island law, a hus-
band is not liable for torts of his wife "unless he participated therein or coerces
her thereto."); Killingsworth v. Keen, 154 P. 1096, 1096 (Wash. 1916) (Under
Washington law, a husband is not liable "except where he would be jointly re-
sponsible with her if the marriage did not exist.").
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ing legal fiction that husbands controlled their wives' behavior. A
husband became liable for his wife's tort only if the tort victim could
establish that she acted under his "actual coercion and instigation.'47
Even after legislative reform that expressly emancipated married
women, some courts continued to perceive a husband's liability for his
wife's torts as the natural consequence of his marital right and re-
sponsibility to dominate and protect her. For example, California
courts retained a husband's liability for his wife's torts until 1913
when the legislature expressly made married women liable for their
own torts.48 Texas courts took a similar position. Because the hus-
band dominated the marital relationship, "it would be difficult, if not
impossible, for the courts to determine when she had acted at her own
instance, and when she was guided by his dictation."49 A wife's tort
creditor could attach a husband's separate property solely by asserting
the fact of marriage until an amendment to Texas law in 1921 ex-
pressly protected his separate property from her creditors' recourse. 50
Recall that some married women's property legislation expressly
abrogated a husband's common law liability for his wife's torts "except
in cases where he would be jointly liable with her if the marriage did
not exist," or where his wife acted under his "actual coercion and insti-
gation."5 1 Creditors seized on this statutory language as a launching
pad for marital agency arguments. A wife, as a legal individual, could
commit a tort as agent for her husband. If so, he should be vicariously
liable as her principal and correspondingly, his property subject to her
creditor's recourse.
Under what circumstances does a wife act as an agent for her hus-
band? The answer depends on the legal effect courts assign to the
marriage. A pair of cases is illustrative. In Radke v. Schlundt,52 a
wife negligently injured the plaintiff while driving a horse cart loaded
47. Tanzer v. Read, 145 N.Y.S. 708, 709 (App. Div. 1914) (New York law); see also
Blakeslee v. Tyler, 55 Conn. 397 (1887) (interpreting a Connecticut statute that
authorized legal action against a married woman "for any tort committed by her
without the actual coercion of her husband"); McElroy, 54 A. at 45 (stating that
the general rule in Rhode Island is that when a husband and wife commit a tort
together the presumption is that he has coerced her, but this presumption can be
rebutted by proof that she acted of her own volition); Fadden v. McKinney, 89 A.
351, 354 (Vt. 1914) (indicating that Vermont law holds that a husband is not
liable for the torts of his wife unless "committed by his authority and direction");
Story v. Downey, 20 A. 321, 321 (Vt. 1890) (same).
48. E.g., Henley v. Wilson, 70 P. 21 (Cal. 1902); CAL. CIV. CODE § 171a (1913).
49. McQueen v. Fulgham, 27 Tex. 464, 467 (1864).
50. E.g., Whitney Hardware Co. v. McMahan, 231 S.W. 694, 695 (Tex. 1921) (stating
that Texas statutes leave the wife and the husband liable for the torts of the
wife); 1921 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 130 § 1.
51. See supra text accompanying notes 47-49.
52. 65 N.E. 770 (Ind. App. 1902).
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with produce grown on the family farm on her way to market. 53
Under Indiana's married women's property law, she was liable for her
own torts as if she were unmarried, except for torts "committed under
her husband's direction or in his presence with his consent," in which
case, the spouses were jointly liable.5 4 The plaintiff argued that the
wife was her husband's servant and that the tort occurred within the
scope of their master/servant relationship. The court expressly re-
jected the plaintiffs characterization of the defendant's marriage as a
master/servant relationship. It noted that while she acts "within her
proper domestic sphere," a wife is not a servant to her husband.55 The
court offered no alternative characterization of their relationship.
Similarly, in, McNemar v. Cohn,56 the plaintiff sued both husband
and wife for damage to buildings caused by a trash fire the wife set
behind the couple's store. Illinois law had abrogated common law lia-
bility of a husband for the torts of his wife, "except in cases where he
would be jointly responsible with her if the marriage did not exist."5 7
The court dismissed the agency-based claim against the husband not-
ing that although the wife helped her husband by maintaining the
family home and working in the store, she was not his agent for fire
starting purposes.58
Creditors' assertion that the husband was vicariously liable for his
wife's tort based on agency between them required courts to interpret
the effect on third parties of the 'new' marital relationship. In Radke,
the court found the wife's discretion in household matters to be
"within her proper domestic sphere" as a wife, and legally distinct
from that of the typical servant, for whom the master is vicariously
liable. In McNemar, the court cleverly dodged the issue. Even if the
wife was the husband's servant for house and store keeping, her negli-
gent fire starting was outside the scope their marital master/servant
relationship and thus outside the range of the husband's vicarious lia-
bility. Both courts may have viewed creditors' agency arguments as
an affront to husbands' newfound freedom from liability for their
53. Id. at 771.
54. Id. at 773 (citing 1881 Ind. Acts §§ 6965, 6966); see also Strouse v. Leipf, 14 So.
667 (Ala. 1893) (Alabama law); Christensen v. Johnston 207 Ill. App. 209 (1917)
(Illinois law); Weber v. Weber, 11 N.W. 389 (Mich. 1882) (under Michigan law,
wife solely liable for her torts); Moore v. Doerr, 203 S.W. 672 (Mo. 1918) (Missouri
law); Killingsworth v. Keen, 154 P. 1096 (Wash. 1916) (Washington law).
55. Radke, 65 N.E. at 774. The court noted that "the occasion of her trip to town
being the marketing of such farm products as are usually under the supervision
and control of the farmer's wife, and the purchasing of articles for family use; the
business of her trip relating to domestic matters." Id. at 771.
56. 115 Ill. App. 31 (1904).
57. Id. at 35. The court noted that by 1874, previous legislation in 1861 and 1869
had so modified the common law relationship between husband and wife "that
scarcely a vestige of it remained." Id. at 35.
58. Id.
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wives' torts. For creditors, though, husbands' new freedom was a radi-
cal setback but for the possibility of agency. 59 Without a way to spread
a wife's liability to her husband, a wife's tort creditor typically faced
an insolvent defendant, no claim against her husband, and no re-
course to his property.
A recurring question in all jurisdictions was whether a married wo-
man's legal capacity to hold legal title to property separate from her
husband included the power to act as a surety for her husband. (Her
liability as surety gave her husband's creditor recourse by foreclosure
to her separate property.)60 For example, in 1896, the Idaho Supreme
Court held that a married woman could bind her separate property by
contract, but her husband could not bind her personally or subject her
separate property to his creditors' claims by his contract.6 1 Because
she had legal capacity and control over her separate property, how-
ever, she could by her own act become a surety for her husband's debt
and thereby expose her separate property to his creditor. 6 2 Two years
later, the Idaho Supreme Court reversed its position. It held that
59. By the end of the nineteenth century, most courts relieved husbands of marital
tort liability even in the absence of express statutory relief, often with great rhe-
torical flourish. For example, in Martin v. Robson, 65 Ill. 129, 139 (1872), the
court stated that:
The chains of the past have been broken by the progression of the pre-
sent, and she may now enter upon the stern conflicts of life untrammel-
led. She no longer clings to and depends upon man, but has the legal
right and aspires to battle with him in the contests of the forum; to out-
vie him in the healing art; to climb with him the steps of fame, and to
share with him in every occupation. Her brain and hands and tongue
are her own, and she should alone be responsible for slanders uttered by
herself.
See also Lane v. Bryant, 37 S.W. 584, 585 (Ky 1896) (quoting above language
from Martin v. Robson, 65 Ill. 129, 139 (1872)). In Goken v. Dallugge, 72 Neb. 16,
18-19, 99 N.W. 818, 818-19 (1904), the Court stated:
The wife may now be "the head of the family" as respects homestead
rights and exemptions. She is equally entitled with her husband to the
guardianship of the offspring of the marriage in case of separation, and
she may have an absolute divorce, with alimony, almost for the asking,
because of "extreme cruelty"; which falls far short of personal chastise-
ment or restraint of liberty. Even if not divorced, public sentiment will
not tolerate that she be compelled to abide with him, although she be
destitute of provocation or excuse for doing otherwise, and his criticism
of her conduct must not exceed approval by the refined manners of "po-
lite society." We think that so nearly a complete "emancipation" of the
wife must in an equal degree emancipate the husband also, and free him
from obligations that were incident to a state of law and society that has
vanished before the progress of modern ideas.
60. See generally Loeb, supra note 16, at 34-36 (noting that some states imposed
restrictions on married women's capacity to act as surety for husbands based on
legislative perception of "feminine weakness .... [A]nd the probability that her
confidence, which she so freely accords, may be taken advantage of...
61. Dernham v. Rowley, 44 P. 643, 645 (Idaho 1896).
62. See id.
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
where both spouses signed a promissory note for a community debt,
the creditor had the personal liability of both spouses, but no recourse
to the wife's separate property. While a married woman could bind
herself personally for separate debt incurred for her exclusive benefit,
she lacked capacity to become a consensual surety for her husband's
debt or for the debt of the community. 6 3 In 1903, the Idaho legislature
amended its community property law to afford a married woman con-
trol over separate property coextensive with that afforded to married
men. 64 However, the Idaho Supreme Court continued to hold that a
married woman lacked legal capacity to incur liability on the strength
of her separate property when she acted as surety for her husband on
his separate debt or on community debt.65 In 1939, the court ex-
plained its narrow interpretation of married women's legal capacity as
a means of protecting married women given the non-egalitarian real-
ity of marriage. 6 6 Oddly, the protection extended only to preclude un-
secured creditors from foreclosing on her separate estate. Idaho law
did not protect a married woman from the consequences of a pledge of
her separate property by mortgage or security interest to enhance her
husband's credit.6 7 In 1977, the Idaho Supreme Court reversed a long
line of decisions and recognized that a married woman's capacity to
incur personal liability by contract extends to contracts of suretyship
for her husband.68
In community property jurisdictions, married women could hold ti-
tle to property either as a member of the marital community or indi-
vidually, separate from the marital community. 69 Married women's
63. Jaeckel v. Pease, 53 P. 399, 400 (Idaho 1898).
64. Williams v. Paxton, 559 P.2d 1123, 1127 (Idaho 1976) (describing amendment).
65. Bank of Commerce, Ltd. v. Baldwin, 85 P. 497 (Idaho 1906).
66. In Loomis v. Gray, 90 P.2d 529, 536 (Idaho 1939), the court noted the following:
[Ilt is common knowledge that wives are not usually experienced in busi-
ness, do not know what they may sign without making their separate
property liable .... [To require a wife to openly repudiate the acts of her
husband in order to protect her property from liability for his unautho-
rized acts [using her separate funds and separate credit to further com-
munity business] would make it necessary for the wife whenever her
husband requested her to sign a paper . . . to closely interrogate him
about the matter, and if still in doubt, to obtain legal advice. Such con-
stant questioning would, no doubt, lead to misunderstandings, suspicion
and turmoil, and thus largely destroy the peace and tranquility of the
home which sound public policy would preserve.
67. Williams, 599 P.2d at 1133 (Donaldson, J., dissenting) (citing Bank of Commerce,
85 P. 497 at 499).
68. Id. at 1132.
69. The law governing the characteristic of property as community or separate is
complex and varies among community property jurisdictions. In general, prop-
erty one of the spouses owned prior to marriage continues to be his or her sepa-
rate property during marriage. Gifts and bequests of property one spouse
receives during marriage are separate property. All other property is community
property, including all earnings of either spouse. Commingling of separate prop-
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legal emancipation increased the possibility that either spouse could
incur liability individually or as an agent for the marital community.
The new permutations exponentially increased the complexity of the
effect of an individual's marital status on his credit relationships. An
important challenge for creditors of community spouses was obtaining
the right to foreclose on community property to satisfy one spouse's
tort liability. As in non-community property jurisdictions, communal
ownership of property did not correspond with the shared right to con-
trol it. With some exceptions, community property jurisdictions recog-
nized the husband as having the exclusive right to manage and
transfer nearly all the couple's community personal property.70 By
the early twentieth century, however, most community property
states had enacted significant limitations on husbands' unilateral
property control rights. For example, in New Mexico, California, Ari-
zona and Texas, the husband's "head and master" control right ex-
cluded community real property as to which joinder of both spouses
was required. 71
During the same period, other community property jurisdictions
made creditors' recourse to community property depend on whether
the debtor had the right to manage it, not whether he held exclusive
title to it. The effect of this "right to manage" approach was to afford
creditors of husbands with broad access to community property coex-
tensive with the husbands' broad statutory rights to manage it. For
example, under California law, each spouse held a "present, equal and
existing" interest in community property. 72 Until the mid-twentieth
century, the husband held the exclusive right to manage community
personal property other than the wife's earnings or property she ac-
erty with community property changes separate to community property and all
property obtained by either spouse during marriage is presumptively community
property. See W. S. McCLANAHAN, COMMUNITY PROPERTY LAW IN THE UNITED
STATES § 10:4, at 483-84 (Lawyers Co-op. Publ'g Co. 1982).
70. See McCA.NAHAN, supra note 69, § 4:21, at 216 (noting that under Spanish com-
munity property system, the husband had "practically complete management and
control of the community property").
71. E.g., In re Risse, 319 P.2d 789, 793 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1957) (describing Califor-
nia statutory provision requiring wife's consent to transfer of community real
property interest as "wife's veto power"); Frkovich v. Petranovich, 151 P.2d 337,
342 (N.M. 1944) (describing 1915 amendment to New Mexico's community prop-
erty law that made either spouse's unilateral conveyance of community real prop-
erty void, thereby eliminating the husband's unilateral right to control
community real property); ARIz. REV. STAT. §§ 33-451, 33-452 (LexisNexis 1956);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.16.040 (West 1961). In the early twentieth century,
some community property states enacted married women's wage legislation
which granted management powers to community wives in certain forms of prop-
erty, notably a married woman's wages. McCLANAHAN, supra note 69, at § 4:21.
72. CAL. CIV. CODE § 161a (West 1954).
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quired by testamentary disposition or gift.73 In 1941, the California
Supreme Court held that a husband's tort creditor had recourse to
both spouses' interests in community personal property as a corollary
of the husband's statutory right to control it.74 Conversely, when a
wife incurred an obligation as an individual (other than for neces-
saries for which her husband was also personally liable), her tort cred-
itor had no recourse to community personal property because she had
no right to control it.75 This interpretation left observers wondering
what the California legislature could have meant by declaring both
spouses' interests in community property as "present, equal . . ." and
"existing."7 6
An alternative response to resolve the problem of creditor recourse
to community property was to afford one spouse's creditor recourse to
it only to the extent of the debtor spouse's one-half interest. 7 7 This
response brought into focus the role of marriage as a buffer for the
economic welfare of family members against the claims of outsider
creditors. If a creditor of one community spouse could foreclose on
that spouse's one-half interest in community property, then logically
community property held by an intact marital family would be subject
to partition and forced sale. Courts were accustomed to dividing com-
munity property as a final accounting between spouses at death or
73. Id. § 168 (exclusion of wife's earnings from husband's control); id. § 172a (West
1966); see also ARiz. REV. STAT. § 25-211 (LexisNexis 1956); N.M. STAT. § 57-4-3
(1953); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.16.030 (1961). See generally, LaTourette v.
LaTourette, 137 P. 426, 428 (Ariz. 1915) (noting that the husband's exclusive
right to manage community personalty was not "in recognition of any higher or
superior right that he has therein" but rather because of the expedience of recog-
nizing a single agent for the community); WILLIAM Q. DE FUNIAK & MICHAEL J.
VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY § 113, at 276 (Univ. Ariz. Press, 2d
ed. 1971) (Recognition of the husband as the exclusive agent for the community
justified by both gender supremacy and administrative expediency.). If a hus-
band did dispose of community personalty in fraud of his wife, the transfer to the
third party would be valid. The defrauded wife would have a claim against the
husband for fraud. DE FUNIAK & VAUGHN, supra, § 113, at 276.
74. Grolemund v. Cafferata, 111 P.2d 641, 644 (Cal. 1941) ("To hold that the husband
could not subject the community property to liability for his tort would be to hold
that he could not manage and control the same.").
75. E.g., McClain v. Tufts, 187 P.2d 818 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1947). To afford her
creditor recourse to the community property "would be not only an unwarranted
interference with, and infringement upon, the husband's right to management
and control, but it would also permit his property to be taken for what is, as to
him, a nonexistent liability." Id. at 819.
76. See Norvie L. Lay, Tort Liability of Community Property, 13 WAYNE L. REV. 706,
709 (1967).
77. New Mexico took this approach. E.g., McDonald v. Senn, 204 P.2d 990, 1000
(N.M. 1949); N.M.STAT. § 40-3-10 (West 1978) (creditor of community wife enti-
tled to recourse to her one half interest in community property). New Mexico's
statute barred a married woman from incurring contract liability on the strength
of community property. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-4-2 (West 1953). But it was silent
as to her tort creditors' recourse to community property.
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dissolution of marriage. They balked at the prospect of partitioning
community property for a creditor's benefit, in many cases, subjecting
the non-debtor community spouse to the loss of her financial security.
Community property should be "left intact for the support and mainte-
nance of the family" and should not be depleted during the marriage
"for obligations not incurred for the benefit of the family."78
This theme, that a spouse's inchoate interest in community prop-
erty was morally superior to the creditor's foreclosure interest, re-
flected a glaring flaw in the theory of marital community. Husband
and wife were not in fact one, but rather two. Despite the utopian
metaphor of the marital community, either spouse was and is legally
entitled to incur liability benevolently for the betterment of the com-
munity or recklessly and selfishly to its detriment. 79 Some jurisdic-
tions took on the task of differentiating between fact and theory in
creditors' foreclosure actions. One resolution was to permit a creditor
of only one spouse to foreclose on community property only if the
debtor spouse incurred the obligation for the benefit of the marital
community. Under this approach, creditor recourse to community
property turned on an assessment of the nexus between the liability
and the marriage. A creditor holding "community debt" could reach
community property; a creditor holding a spouse's "separate" debt
could not. In the latter case, the creditor would have the debtor's per-
sonal liability and recourse by judicial process to the debtor's separate
property but not to either spouse's interest in community property.8 0
Most jurisdictions adopting this approach afforded creditors with a
presumption that contract liability incurred by either spouse during
the marriage was community debt.s1 When the debt was contractual,
78. DE FUNIAK & VAUGHAN, supra note 73, § 162, at 385. Some courts expressed dis-
approval of the deleterious effect of splitting community property for the creditors
of one spouse. E.g., Columbia Nat'l Bank of Dayton v. Embree, 26 P. 257, 257
(Wash. 1891) (noting with disapproval that under Washington law, each spouse
can devise one-half of community property, and that "persons interested in the
community may be entirely excluded, and the property given at will to a
stranger").
79. For a modern critique of the utopian metaphor or marital community, see Andrea
B. Carroll, The Superior Position of the Creditor in the Community Property Re-
gime: Has the Community Become a Mere Creditor Collection Device?, 47 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 1, 17-18 (2007).
80. Courts faced conflicts between the laws of the jurisdictions where the debt was
incurred and property acquired. E.g., La Selle v. Woolery, 44 P. 115, 115 (Wash.
1896). Some debtors took advantage of the differences in law between jurisdic-
tions. E.g., Snyder v. Stringer, 198 P. 733 (Wash. 1921) (husband purchased au-
tomobile on credit in a neighboring non-community property state (separate
debt); the automobile was community property once brought into Washington,
where the couple lived).
81. E.g., Cosper v. Valley Bank, 237 P. 175, 178 (Ariz. 1925); Strong v. Eakin, 66 P.
539, 542 (N.M. 1901). See generally DE FuNrIAK & VAUGHN, supra note 73, § 161,
at 382 (noting that the issue of creditor recourse to community property is "ex-
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the couple bore the burden of showing that it did not benefit the com-
munity.8 2 As for tort liability incurred by only one spouse, however,
jurisdictions varied widely in their approaches to characterization of
the debt as "separate" or "community."8 3 The benefit of tort liability to
a couple was considerably more difficult to assess than that of contract
liability, for which the couple usually received capital, property, or
services. Courts approached the characterization of tort liability as
"community" or "separate" based on a fact-driven balance of equity be-
tween the tort victim and the non-debtor spouse. For example, a
plaintiff injured by the negligence of a husband driving a cab for hire
could reach the couple's community property on the theory that the
husband operated the cab for a financial return for the benefit of the
marital community.8 4 A husband who lied in a corporate real estate
transaction acted for the benefit of the community so that the plaintiff
could foreclose on corporate stock the couple held as community prop-
erty.8 5 On the other hand, a court found that a husband's liability for
alienation of the plaintiffs wife's affections was not of benefit to the
community, and protected his wife's interest in community property
from the plaintiffs foreclosure action.8 6 Also, a husband's liability for
burning down a community-owned business in an attempt to collect
insurance money and liability was his separate obligation.8 7 Over
time, jurisdictions adopting the debt-characterization approach re-
laxed the required nexus between a tort obligation and the community
ceedingly difficult, for the statutes of the different states are all at sixes and
sevens").
82. DE FuNiAK & VAUGHN, supra note 73, § 161, at 383.
83. See generally 15A AM. Jun. 2D Community Property § 98 (2000).
84. "It is clear, we think, that if the community... had employed a man to drive the
automobile, and the negligence of this employee had caused the injury, the com-
munity would be liable .... [Blecause the employee would be the agent of the
community...." Milne v. Kane, 116 P. 659, 659 (Wash. 1911); see also Kangley v.
Rogers, 147 P. 898, 898 (Wash. 1915) (husband/notary public falsely certifies in
capacity as an agent for a marital community).
85. Wimmer v. Nicholson, 275 P. 699, 700 (Wash. 1929) (court noted that the only
source of income to the community was the husband's salary from the corporation
and the return on their investment in corporate stock).
86. Schramm v. Steele, 166 P. 634, 637 (Wash. 1917). The court indicated that:
In not a single case has this court held or intimated that community
property, whether real or personal, can be subjected to levy to satisfy a
judgment against the husband alone for a tort committed by him alone,
and not in connection with the community business nor for the benefit of
the community.
Id. at 636; cf. McFadden v. Watson, 74 P.2d 1181, 1183 (Ariz. 1938) (husband's
libel and slander held to be a community debt since husband acted to protect the
financial interest of the community in a partnership).
87. Bergman v. State, 60 P.2d 699, 701 (Wash. 1936).
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and effectively expanded one spouse's tort creditor's recourse to all
community propertyss
The strategic implications of rules governing creditor recourse to
community spouses' property are apparent. If marital property law
limits a creditor's recourse by foreclosure to his or her debtor's sepa-
rate property, a person can use marriage as a wealth shield. For the
price of a marriage license, a person can transform his interest in
property that would have been available to his creditors into commu-
nity property safe from his creditors, but happily within his control.8 9
On the other hand, if one spouse's creditor has a right to foreclose on
community property regardless of the circumstances in which the obli-
gation was incurred (as in jurisdictions that afford creditors recourse
to all community property the debtor had a right to manage), then the
debtor's marital status would appear to some observers as a boon for
creditors at the expense of the debtor's spouse. To the extent the
debtor spouse can expose all community property to his or her credi-
tors' recourse unilaterally, the other spouse's legal individuality and
his or her "present and equal" interest in community property effec-
tively disappears. This result is clearly at odds with the premise of
marriage as a community of equal and legally distinct individuals. 90
All approaches to creditor recourse to community property ad-
dressed the latent question of the scope of marital agency. In commu-
nity property jurisdictions, creditors enjoy a special "back door" to the
non-debtor spouse's interest in community property. A creditor of a
community spouse can foreclose on community property the debtor
has a right to manage, or whenever the liability benefits the commu-
nity, without showing that the debtor spouse incurred the liability as
an agent for the other spouse. It is important to note that this "back
door" to community property does not make the non-debtor spouse
personally liable for the other spouse's debt. Nor does it expose the
88. See Werker v. Knox, 85 P.2d 1041, 1042 (Wash. 1938) (noting a trend "quite defi-
nitely in the direction of finding ways and means of imposing such liabilities upon
the community"). In Werker, the court held that liability from the wife's negli-
gent operation of the family car was a community debt. Id. at 1044. Three years
earlier, the same court held that liability from an assault in the course of driving
the family car was a separate debt. Newbury v. Remington, 52 P.2d 312, 313
(Wash. 1935). See generally DE FUNIAK & VAUGHN, supra note 73, § 161, at 382
(noting that the issue of creditor recourse to community property is "exceedingly
difficult, for the statutes of the different states are all at sixes and sevens").
89. The effect became known as "marital bankruptcy." See, e.g., Hines v. Hines, 707
P.2d 969, 971 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985); Schilling v. Embree, 575 P.2d 1262, 1264
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1977). See generally Carroll, supra note 79, at 8-9.
90. DE FUNIAK & VAUGHAN, supra note 73, § 179, at 420-21 ("There is no reason in
justice why the property of one who has not joined in undertakings with another,
who stands to share in no profits from such undertakings, should share the bur-




non-debtor spouse's separate property to risk of loss to the debtor
spouse's creditors. A creditor who cannot satisfy its claim via back
door access to community property can still proceed against commu-
nity property and the non-debtor spouse's separate property, but only
by establishing the other spouse's personal liability. To do that, credi-
tors in community property jurisdictions must use the front door to
establish that the debtor spouse acted as agent for the other spouse. 9 1
Creditors used married women's individuality to challenge the the-
oretical foundation of the marital estate of tenancy by the entirety.
Tenancy by the entirety reflects a uniquely marital unity of title pre-
mised on the unity of person model of marriage. Both spouses hold an
undivided one half interest in tenancy by the entirety property. And a
creditor of only one spouse cannot partition it to foreclose on the
debtor spouse's interest while the couple remains married without the
consent of the other spouse.9 2 In 1900, the Nebraska Supreme Court
found tenancy by the entirety out of step with the post-reform marital
relationship: "The old common-law idea of the oneness in the relation
of husband and wife is fast disappearing. The identity of the woman is
not lost in her husband. She is no longer under his dominion or con-
trol.... [but they] are now considered as equals; and the relation as a
dual equality.. .. "93 The post-reform individuality of married women
and the legal independence of spouses shook the theoretical founda-
tion of tenancy by the entirety all to the advantage of creditors.
The chasm between married women's individuality for purposes of
title to property and their legal right to control it persisted for more
than a century after reform. Husbands typically held title to the
couple's wealth and enjoyed nearly unilateral power to control it, ex-
cept for limitations such as statutes that recognized wives' rights in
91. E.g., Munger v. Boardman, 88 P.2d 536 (Ariz. 1939) (wife deemed agent of hus-
band by estoppel in favor of mortgagee of couple's real property); Hulsman v.
Ireland, 270 P. 948 (Cal. 1928) (in a case of first impression, wife who incurred
debt in restaurant business was agent by estoppel for her husband personally,
and for their marital community; husband knew of, and benefited from, restau-
rant business); Travers v. Barrett, 97 P. 126 (Nev. 1900) (husband and commu-
nity property not liable for wife's contract to sell property, husband had
authorized wife to lease, but not sell).
92. See supra notes 22-24. The not-so-latent justification for tenancy by the entirety
estate today is as a wealth-shielding device for married couples. See, e.g.,
Sawada v. Endo, 561 P.2d 1291, 1297 (Haw. 1977) ("If we were to select between
a public policy favoring the creditors of one of the spouses and one favoring the
interests of the family unit, we would not hesitate to choose the latter." ).
93. Kerner v. McDonald, 60 Neb. 663, 84 N.W. 92 (1900). See generally 7 RICHARD R.
POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 52.01 at 52-11 (Michael Allan Wolf, ed.,
LexisNexis Matthew Bender 2007) ("[Tlenancy by the entirety remains a viable
alternative in a majority of states in spite of periodic predictions of its demise.");
see generally Peter M. Carrozzo, Tenancies in Antiquity: A Transformation of
Concurrent Ownership for Modern Relationships, 85 MARQ. L. REV. 423, 445-46
(2001).
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their own wages, or required joinder for real property transactions, or
the common law doctrine of necessaries. 94 In a 1967 law review arti-
cle, a scholar noted that "the community property system vests the
control and management of the common property in the hands of the
husband, as the partner who due to economic and biological factors is
more practiced and experienced in the acquisition and management of
property."95
During this period, married women experienced a scissor effect
from married women's property reform. They gained individuality for
purposes of property rights, liability, and agency. They enjoyed no
corresponding expansion of their legal or practical rights to control
property or their husbands' conduct. Even so, by the end of the first
half of the twentieth century, judicial solicitude for wives' economic
plight in creditors' rights cases became muted. During the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth century, middle class couples were clearly
using wives' separate estates as an asset protection strategy to shield
wealth from husbands' creditors. 96 The new rhetoric in these cases
became legal, not equitable. It focused on the legal independence of
spouses and the corresponding possibility of an agency or partnership
between them as a means by which she and her separate property
might be liable for his debt. Ironically, a married woman's legal (but
not practical) independence from her husband and his risky behavior
became a weapon in creditors' hands to undermine her efforts to pro-
tect herself by accumulating a nest egg in her own name.
94. In jurisdictions recognizing tenancy by the entirety, until reform in the last quar-
ter of the twentieth century, husbands enjoyed exclusive control over tenancy by
the entirety property. See George L. Haskins, Estates Arising from the Marriage
Relationship and Their Characteristics in 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY: A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 615-758 (A. James
Casner, ed., Little, Brown & Co. 1952); 2 ROBERT E. LEE, NORTH CAROLINA FAM-
ILY LAW § 107 (4th ed. 1980). As an example of reform, see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 39-
13-6 (1983) (husband and wife have equal right to the control real property held
by them in tenancy by the entirety and neither spouse may alienate it without
the written joinder of the other spouse).
95. Michael J. Vaughn, The Policy of Community Property and Inter-Spousal Trans-
actions, 19 BAYLOR L. REV. 20, 45 (1967). See generally Scott Greene, Comparison
of the Property Aspects of the Community Property and Common-Law Marital
Property Systems and Their Relative Compatibility with the Current View of the
Marriage Relationship and the Rights of Women, 13 CREIGHTON L. REV. 71 (1979).
96. E.g., Pinkston v. Cedar Hill Nursery & Orchard Co., 51 S.E. 387 (Ga. 1905) (wife
who owned orchard held liable for husband's debt to plant nursery as his undis-
closed principal where he falsely represented he owned the orchard to nursery
vendor); Smith v. Miller, 280 N.W. 493 (Iowa 1938) (wife liable for husband's
fraud in connection with sale of her property); Atherton v. Barber, 128 N.W. 827
(Minn. 1910) (same); Watring v. Gibson, 100 S.E. 68 (W. Va. 1919) (same). But
see Etheridge v. Price, 11 S.W. 1039 (Tex. 1889) (wife not liable for husband's oral
misrepresentation in sale of her land where deed did not contain misrepresenta-




The possibility of an egalitarian partnership between husband and
wife captured public attention in 1930 when the U.S. Supreme Court
considered the effect of asserted marital partnerships in two income
attribution tax cases. In both cases, married couples asserted that
they were partners as justification for attributing salary earned by the
husband to both. In Lucas v. Earl,97 the Court rejected such an agree-
ment as a sham.98 The income was the husband's and was taxable
entirely to him notwithstanding their private agreement otherwise.
In contrast, in Poe v. Seaborn,9 9 the Court validated a Washington
couple's agreement to share income as a valid partnership. Despite
the husband's exclusive power to control community property in the
form of his income,10 0 the Court held that Washington law gave the
wife a present property interest in it, which she could contribute to
their marital partnership.1 0 1 The cases reveal a gap between the legal
property rights of married women vis-'-vis their husbands and the
prevailing view of marriage, under which wives typically depended on
their husbands for support and deferred to their management and
control of property. In the first case, the Court held that the hus-
band's income was his and no agreement between the spouses could
change that for income tax purposes. In the second, the Court de-
ferred to state community property law on the income tax issue, even
though by all other accounts, the husband's earned income was "his"
and not really "theirs."
In 1946, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the key attributes of a
marital partnership for the purpose of income attribution were shared
contribution to, and control over, a business enterprise or investment
97. 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
98. 'There is no doubt that the statute could tax salaries to those who earned them
and provide that the tax could not be escaped by anticipatory arrangements and
contracts however skillfully devised to prevent the salary when paid from vesting
even for a second in the man who earned it." Id. at 114-15.
99. 282 U.S. 101 (1930).
100. The Poe court stated that:
The reasons for conferring such sweeping powers of management on the
husband are not far to seek. Public policy demands that in all ordinary
circumstances, litigation between wife and husband during the life of the
community should be discouraged. Law-suits between them would tend
to subvert the marital relation. The same policy dictates that third par-
ties who deal with the husband respecting community property shall be
assured that the wife shall not be permitted to nullify his transactions.
Id. at 112.
101. The U.S. Attorney General had issued several opinions treating a California
wife's interest in community property as a "mere expectancy contingent on her
husband's death" but treating a wife's interest in community property in Wash-
ington, Arizona, Texas and other community property states as a "present
vested" interest. Id. at 113-14.
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other than the financial integration normally incident to marriage.10 2
"If [the wife] either invests capital originating with her or substan-
tially contributes to the control and management of the business, or
otherwise performs vital additional services, or does all of these
things, she may be a partner .... ."103 Two years later, Congress ended
the crisis that the prospect of marital partnership had posed to the
income tax system. It permitted all married couples to attribute in-
come earned by either to both on a joint tax return with joint tax lia-
bility, regardless of who actually owned or controlled the income. 0 4
Joint return legislation solved the marital partnership problem for in-
come taxes. It left undisturbed, however, the Court's view that a
couple's shared investment in their marriage could not invoke part-
nership consequences absent an arm's length relationship between
the spouses in which both agreed to share ownership and control of
property in an enterprise that was distinct from the ordinary shared
financial enterprise of marriage. "Real" partnership required an
agreement based on legal and financial equality between the partici-
pants, a circumstance mid-twentieth century observers thought was
usually missing between spouses.' 0 5
III. SPOUSES' RESPONSIBILITY FOR EACH OTHER
UNDER MODERN MARRIAGE
In the last half of the twentieth century, the American labor mar-
ket changed. Educational and employment opportunities for women
expanded.10 6 And women advanced toward political and legal equal-
102. Comm'r of Internal Revenue v. Tower, 327 U.S. 280, 290 (1946). "[T]he wife drew
on income which the partnership books attributed to her only for purposes of buy-
ing and paying for the type of things she had bought for herself, home and family
before the partnership was formed." Id. at 291-92. The husband controlled the
income generated by the alleged partnership exactly as he had prior to its forma-
tion; the wife took no part in management of the business. Id. at 291; see also
Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940).
103. Tower, 327 U.S. at 290.
104. 26 U.S.C. § 6015 (2006).
105. For example, in Cooper v. Knox, 90 S.E.2d 844 (Va. 1956), the court protected a
wife from imputed liability for her husband's business debt although she partici-
pated in management of the business. Mrs. Knox had no "voice" in the operation
of the business even though she described it to third parties as "our" business,
kept the business books, and used business revenue to pay the couple's household
expenses. Id. at 846-47. Rather, "her statements and conduct merely indicate a
devoted and faithful wife's interest in the successful operation of her husband's
business," not the existence of a business partnership between them. Id. at 847.
106. See PAULA ENGLAND & GEORGE FARKAS, HOUSEHOLDS, EMPLOYMENT AND GENDER:
A SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, AND DEMOGRAPHIC VIEW 11-15 (Aldine Pub. Co. 1986).
Before World War II, female employment was limited primarily to young, single
women or poor, married women. Few middle-class wives held jobs. WILLIAM
HENRY CHAFE, WOMEN AND EQUALITY: CHANGING PArERNS IN AMERICAN CUL-
TURE 92-93 (Oxford Univ. Press 1977). After the war, despite political efforts to
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ity as legislatures and courts dismantled legal regimes that had been
based on the premise of women's economic inferiority to men.10 7 Mar-
ried women earned an increasing portion of family income.10 8 One
commentator explains that for most married middle class women who
chose to work outside the home, "the decision to get up early, drop the
children off at daycare, and head to the office or factory was [at least
in part] .... a calculated attempt to give their families an economic
edge."10 9 Social attitudes about the role of women as mothers and
caregivers within marriage also changed. In 1970, 78% of younger
married women thought that "it was better for wives to be homemak-
ers and husbands to do the breadwinning."11o By the end of the twen-
tieth century, only 38% of American women described a lone full-time
parental care-giver for children as "ideal"; nearly 70% of adults be-
lieved that the gender of the stay at home parent was irrelevant."'
lure working women out of the labor force, the percentage of women working
outside the home continued to grow. Id. at 94. Chafe notes that in the 1950's
women in the labor force were increasing at a rate four times faster than men.
Id. By 1960, 40% of all women over sixteen were in the labor force compared with
25% in 1940. Id. at 94-95. "The very fact of massive increases in female employ-
ment destroyed the reality of traditional notions of women's 'place' in the home."
Id. at 95-96.
107. E.g., Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (state law allowing women, but not men, to
seek alimony upon divorce violates Equal Protection Clause); Califano v. Gold-
farb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977) (striking a presumption entitling wives and widows, but
not husbands and widowers, to full spousal benefits without proof of financial
dependency); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 643 n.ll (1975) ("[T]he
presumption of complete dependency of wives upon husbands has little relation-
ship to present reality."); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690-91 (1973)
(striking requirement that spouses of female, but not male, members of the uni-
formed services prove dependency for purposes of obtaining benefits as a viola-
tion of the due process clause).
108. Sharon M. Danes & Mary Winter, The Impact of the Employment of the Wife on
the Achievement of Home Ownership, 24 J. CONSUMER AFF. 148, 165-66 (1990);
Mark Evan Edwards, Home Ownership, Affordability, and Mothers' Changing
Work and Family Roles, 82 Soc. Sci. Q. 369, 373-74 (2001). Before the last quar-
ter of the twentieth century, women in the workforce were predominantly older,
lower-income or childless: middle class women tended to become full time home-
makers. Elizabeth Warren, Families Alone: The Changing Economics of Rearing
Children, 58 OKLA. L. REV. 551, 566 (2005); see STEPHANIE COONTz, THE WAY WE
NEVER WERE: AMERICAN FAMILIES AND THE NOSTALGIA TRAP 162 (Basic Books
1992). In the last twenty five years, middle class mothers joined the workforce at
rates exceeding women in other socioeconomic classes. Warren, supra, at 566,
LAWRENCE MISHEL ET AL., THE STATE OF WORKING AMERICA 2002/2003, at 103
(Cornell Univ. Press 2003) (fig. 1S shows the contribution of wives' earnings to
family incomes between 1970 and 2000).
109. Warren, supra note 108, at 565-66.
110. COONTZ, supra note 108, at 168.
111. See ELIZABETH WARREN & AMELIA WARREN TYAGI, THE Two-INCOME TRAP: WHY
MIDDLE-CLASS MOTHERS AND FATHERS ARE GOING BROKE 30, 201 n.59 (Basic
Books 2003) (citing Chris McComb, Few Say It's Ideal for Both Parents to Work
Full Time Outside of Home, GALLUP NEWS SERVICE, May 4, 2001, at 2-3, availa-
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Public opinion about the social role of marriage also changed dra-
matically. Reform in the late twentieth century abandoned fault as
prerequisite for divorce and diminished it as a factor in parties' post-
divorce financial relationship.112 Today, most commentators assert
that the function of divorce law is not to punish transgressing spouses
for their antisocial behavior, but rather to make a "clean break" for
the couple financially.113 Divorce law prescribes the process of recon-
ciling spouses' claims against each other. The process and principles
of divorce allow the couple to disentangle their individual interests
from their marriage, dissolve their joint investments, and go their sep-
arate ways. 114 While a couple is married, however, the scope of one
spouse's responsibility for the other to a third party is not purely a
private matter between the spouses. Divorce law reform did not
change the effect of a marital relationship on creditors-at least not
directly.
A. Status-Based Shared Liability
Even though divorce law reconstructs marriage as a contract at the
will of the parties, marital status-the fact that two people are mar-
ried-triggers shared financial responsibility to third parties without
regard to the parties' private agreement. In other words, in some cir-
cumstances, an insolvent spouse's liability is the other spouse's prob-
lem simply because the couple is married. Today, perhaps the most
economically significant source of status-based shared liability is for
debt either spouse incurs for "necessaries." Two-thirds of the states
retain the common law doctrine of necessaries, including five of the
nine community property jurisdictions. 115 Some jurisdictions have
ble at http://poll.gallup.com/content/default.aspx?ci=1558 (available by subscrip-
tion only)).
112. California passed the first no-fault divorce legislation in 1970. See CAL. CIV.
CODE §§ 4503-09 (West 1970). By 1985, all states recognized a basis for no-fault
divorce. See Timothy B. Walker, Family Law in the Fifty States: An Overview, 25
F.m. L.Q. 417, 439-40 (1992).
113. E.g., Herma Hill Kay, An Appraisal of California's No-Fault Divorce Law, 75 CAL.
L. REV. 291, 313 (1987) (California's no-fault divorce statute achieves a "clean
break" between spouses); Milton C. Regan, Jr., Spouses and Strangers: Divorce
Obligations and Property Rhetoric, 82 GEO. L.J. 2303, 2314 (1994) (discussing
how the new model of marriage and divorce replaced state-imposed status and
duty with a transitory relationship between individuals who voluntarily yield
some autonomy over their property and person until they end the marriage and
regain the full measure of their individual autonomy).
114. E.g., UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT, Prefatory Note, 9A U.L.A. 149 (1987) ("The
distribution of property upon the termination of a marriage should be treated, as
nearly as possible, like the distribution of assets incident to the dissolution of a
partnership.").
115. See, e.g., 23 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 4102 (West 2001) (creditor for necessaries of
one spouse may sue both spouses, execute against property of contracting spouse,
and if insufficient property is found, recover from property of non-contracting
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adopted "family expense" statutes that impose liability on both hus-
band and wife for designated family expenses incurred by either of
them.1 16 These laws impose a range of shared financial responsibility
on spouses, regardless of their private agreement as to who between
them will bear the risk. Driver insolvency in automobile accidents
prompted the emergence of the "family purpose doctrine" by which
courts imposed one family member's tort liability on other solvent
family members based on family activities as joint enterprise. Under
this doctrine, family members were de facto agents of one another for
operation of the family automobile, and also shared financial responsi-
bility for tort victims of the joint enterprise. 117 Today, permissive use
and mandatory automobile insurance legislation address the problem
of driver insolvency, and many jurisdictions have abrogated the com-
mon law family purpose doctrine. 118
Community property jurisdictions impose an important source of
shared liability on married people by way of the doctrine that governs
creditors' foreclosure rights in community property. Statutes vary,
spouse); see Jill Elaine Hasday, The Canon of Family Law, 57 STAN. L. REV. 825,
838 n.34 (2006) (listing selected jurisdictions); Phillips, Nizer, Benjamin, Krim &
Ballon v. Rosenstiel, 490 F.2d 509, 517 (2d Cir. 1973) (discussing doctrine of
necessaries under common law). Some jurisdictions have found the common law
doctrine of necessaries, which imposed liability for necessaries on husband but
not wife, a violation of the equal Protection Clause and have abrogated it entirely.
E.g., Emanuel v. McGriff, 596 So. 2d 578 (Ala. 1992); N. Ottawa Cmty. Hosp. v.
Kieft, 578 N.W.2d 267 (Mich. 1998).
116. E.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 914 (West 2004); COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-6-110 (2005); 750
ILL. COMP. STAT. 65/15 (1990); IOWA CODE ANN. § 597.14 (West 2001); MONT.
CODE ANN, § 40-2-210 (2005); NEV. REV. SWAT. ANN. § 123.090 (West 2005); TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.201(a)(2) (Vernon 2006); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.16.205
(West 2007) (expenses of the family and the education of the children, including
stepchildren); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 766.55(2) (West 2001). See, e.g., In re Olexa, 317
B.R. 290, 295-97 (Bankr. W.D. Penn. 2004) (debtor's husband secondarily liable
for debtor's credit card debt under state "necessaries" statute); N. Shore Cmty.
Bank & Trust Co. v. Kollar, 710 N.E.2d 106, 109-10 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999) (describ-
ing 'family expenses" as including debts for hospital, medical and funeral ser-
vices, utilities, wearing apparel, including furs and jewelry, rent, wages for
domestic servant, but excluding business expenses, or obligation to repay loan for
cash); Nelson v. First Nat'l Bank Omaha, No. C8-02-11233, 2004 WL 2711032
(Minn. Ct. App. 2004) (not reported) (court denies bank's motion for summary
judgment against husband on absence of proof that wife used credit card for
household articles used by the family).
117. See generally 8 AM. JUR. 2D Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 714 (2007).
118. See, e.g., McMartin v. Saemisch, 116 N.W.2d 491, 494 (Iowa 1962) (holding that
"[iliability may now rest upon the firm foundation of the statute, or a true agency,
etc., and not on an ox bow appendage tenuously attached to the law of agency");
Jacobsen v. Dailey, 36 N.W.2d 711, 715-16 (Minn. 1949) (holding that statute
making the owner liable when the car is driven by another person with the con-
sent of the owner has in effect replaced the family purpose doctrine, such doctrine
is no longer in operation). See generally 7 AM. JUR. 2D Automobile Insurance § 22
(2007).
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but generally recognize a "separate but equal" right for each spouse to
control some forms of community property. 119 Note that unlike te-
nants in common who cannot alienate or encumber the other tenant's
interest without his or her consent, in jurisdictions that match credi-
tor recourse to community property to a community debtor's right to
control it, either spouse's creditor has recourse to all community prop-
erty that spouse has a right to control. 120 Some jurisdictions go even
further in favor of creditors. California and Louisiana expressly afford
a spouse's creditor with recourse to community property the other
spouse manages exclusively.121 Texas allows a tort, but not contract,
creditor to have recourse to community property under the other
spouse's exclusive management.122
Other community property jurisdictions handle creditor recourse
to community property based on whether the debt benefits the com-
119. E.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-214(C) (2007) ("Either spouse separately may
acquire, manage, control or dispose of community property or bind the commu-
nity" subject to enumerated exceptions.); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.16.030
(West 2005) ("Either spouse, acting alone, may manage and control community
property, with a like power of disposition as the acting spouse has over his or her
separate property" subject to enumerated exceptions); see W. S. McCLANAHAN,
COMMUNITY PROPERTY LAW IN THE UNITED STATES §§ 9:11-9:12 (1982) (discussing
transfers of property and "equal management" statutes); Elizabeth De Armond, It
Takes Two: Remodeling the Management and Control Provisions of Community
Property Law, 30 GONZ. L. REV. 235, 247 n.57 (1994). All community property
states require joinder of both spouses for certain transactions, such as those in-
volving real estate, suretyship, or household goods. Some states permit the
couple to designate certain property, such as businesses and partnership and
stock interests, as "exclusive management" property over which one spouse has
the exclusive right to manage. E.g., CAL. FAm. CODE § 1100(d) (West 2004); LA.
CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2350 (1985); NEV. REV. STAT. § 123.230(6) (2007); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 26.16.030 (West 2005). Under some statutes, a spouse who is named
in the title for certain types of community property has sole power to manage it.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-3-14(B) (LexisNexis 1978) (any community property); LA.
CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2351 (1985) (movables issued or registered in the spouse's
name); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2352 (1985 & Supp. 2008) (a partnership interest
held by a spouse). Under Texas law, each spouse retains the exclusive right to
manage property he or she brings into the marriage, and enjoys an equal unilat-
eral right to manage community property acquired during marriage. TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 3.102 (Vernon 2006).
120. See generally De Armond supra note 119, at 247.
121. CAL. FAM. CODE § 910(a) (West 2004) ("Except as otherwise expressly provided by
statute, the community estate is liable for a debt incurred by either spouse before
or during marriage, regardless of which spouse has the management and control
of the property and regardless of whether one or both spouses are parties to the
debt or to a judgment for the debt."); id. § 911 (exception providing for non-liabil-
ity of segregated earnings of non-debtor spouse); LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 2345
(1985) ("A separate or community obligation may be satisfied during the commu-
nity property regime from community property and from the separate property of
the spouse who incurred the obligation.").
122. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.202 (Vernon 2006).
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munity.123 A recurring problem arises when the debt is tort liability
which does not appear to "benefit" the community. If the tort liability
is not a community debt, the tort claimant cannot recover against a
married tortfeasor who holds only community property.
For example, Washington common law generally protects commu-
nity property from creditor recourse to satisfy the separate debts of
either spouse. 124 In deElche v. Jacobsen,125 a spouse incurred sepa-
rate tort liability, but his separate property was insufficient to satisfy
the victim's claim. Under the general rule, the court faced a Hobson's
choice: allow recourse to community property to satisfy separate lia-
bility incurred by one spouse absent "benefit to the community," or
protect all community property at the expense of the tort victim even
though the tortfeasor is solvent, albeit with wealth "tied up" in com-
munity property. 12 6 The court gave the tort victim recourse to com-
munity property for the separate debt. At the same time, it gave the
tortfeasor's spouse a right to reimbursement against the tortfeasor for
any loss to her interest in community property. Her right against the
debtor spouse would be secured by an equitable lien enforceable upon
termination of the community.12 7
123. E.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-215 (2007) (debt incurred for benefit of commu-
nity shall be satisfied first from community property and second from the debtor's
separate property); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-3-10, 40-3-11 (LexisNexis 1978) (a
creditor on separate debt must exhaust his debtor's separate property before
seizure of the debtor spouse's one-half interest in the community property).
Under Wisconsin law, for tort obligations incurred by one spouse, only the
tortfeasor's share of community property is liable. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 766.55
(West 2001). E.g., Max L. Wells Trust v. Grand Cent. Sauna & Hot Tub Co., 815
P.2d 284 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991) (obligation incurred or enterprise undertaken by
either spouse during marriage is presumptively for benefit of community). But
see Colorado Nat'l Bank v. Merlino, 668 P.2d 1304 (Wash. Ct. App. 1983) (given
broad community management powers of both spouses in Washington, debt for
purchase of real property is presumptively separate debt where other spouse does
not execute transaction).
124. Nichols Hills Bank v. McCool, 701 P.2d 1114 (Wash. 1985). But see Fisch v.
Marler, 97 P.2d 147 (Wash. 1939) (husband's former wife could seize his commu-
nity property to satisfy his support obligation to her based on statutory exception
to rule in favor of a creditor who reduces liability to judgment within three years
before the debtor's marriage for separate debts for child support and to the
debtor's former spouse as to the debtor's "earnings and accumulations"); WASH
REV. CODE. ANN. § 26.16.200 (West 2005) (exceptions to immunity of community
property for separate debt for child support and as to debtor spouse's "earnings
and accumulations" in favor of a creditor who reduces liability to judgment within
three years before marriage).
125. 622 P.2d 835 (Wash. 1980).
126. Id. at 838.
127. Id. at 840. See also id. at 842 (Horowitz, J., dissenting) ("Community property,
enjoying such a protected position in our scheme of marital community owner-
ship, cannot be subjected to the individual spouse's separate debt simply because
it in some sense "belongs" to him .... "). In Keene v. Edie, 935 P.2d 588, 595
(Wash. 1997), the Court expanded the holding in deElche to afford a tort creditor
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B. Imputed Liability
As we have seen, spouses' prerogative to hold wealth either as indi-
viduals or jointly within marriage makes it possible for spouses to
adopt a private allocation of wealth for the purpose of shielding some
assets from risk of loss to creditors. To respond to this strategy, credi-
tors of an insolvent spouse argue that the other spouse who is not di-
rectly liable (and her separately-held property interests) should be
liable by imputation. Where the liability at issue is not one for which
spouses share liability by virtue of marital or family status, creditors
must show a partnership or other agency relationship between
spouses to impute one spouse's liability to the other.
Partnership and agency law tend to allocate loss an insolvent
debtor cannot absorb to the party whose relationship with the debtor
affords him a relative advantage in insuring against or preventing the
loss in the first place.128 For example, the term "partnership" refers
to a mutual agency relationship in which participants act as agents for
each other to carry on a shared business enterprise. 129 Persons who
intend to be partners are agents for the partnership and are vicari-
ously liable for each other's conduct within the scope of the partner-
ship. 130 The fact that two persons co-own property and share the
profits and losses it generates is not enough to establish a partnership
with corresponding shared liability. 13 1 The two people must share
recourse to community real property. In Haley v. Highland, 12 P.3d 119 (Wash.
2000), a tort creditor could reach the debtor's one half interest in community
property even though the tort occurred prior to the marriage. Under Arizona law,
a creditor of one spouse on pre-marital separate debt can foreclose on community
property "but only to the extent of the value of that spouse's contribution to the
community property which would have been such spouse's separate property if
single." ARIZONA REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-215(b) (2007); e.g., Schilling v. Embree,
575 P.2d 1262, 1264 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977).
128. Although the purpose of vicarious liability is debatable, the dominant explana-
tion is efficiency. See BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 2, § 4.07(a) (partnership
tort and contractual liability is justified by the principle that the partnership
should bear the loss if it could efficiently reduce the probability of the harms
occurring by controlling its partners). See generally Latent Efficiency, supra note
4, at 1227-34 (explaining how equity holders, creditors, and transferees of the
debtor can avoid or insure against the debtor's default and insolvency).
129. E.g., REVISED UNIF. P'SHIP. Act § 306(a), 6 U.L.A. 117 (1997) (all partners are
jointly and severally liable for all obligations of the partnership). If a third party
can establish that the persons are partners then the debtor's agency for the part-
nership is presumed under partnership law for any act that is carrying on the
partnership in the usual way, unless the third party knows the person's authority
is restricted. Id. § 301(1), 6 U.L.A. at 101. See generally BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN,
supra note 2, §§ 4.07- 4.08 (describing a partner's presumptive power to bind the
partnership as to "usual or ordinary course" acts as "partnership power").
130. REVISED UNIF. P'SHip ACT § 3.08, 6 U.L.A. at 128.
131. Id. § 202(c) cmt. 1, 6 U.L.A. at 93 ("[P)assive co-ownership of property by itself, as
distinguished from the carrying on of a business, does not establish a
partnership.").
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both ownership and control of an enterprise.132 The legal right to con-
trol an enterprise gives a participant who does not incur direct liabil-
ity an opportunity to monitor, control, and insure against loss from
the other partner's conduct within the scope of their shared enter-
prise. This opportunity gives the other participant an advantage in
preventing or insuring against risk of loss from the debtor's conduct
over a creditor who has only a credit relationship with the debtor.
Shared ownership creates an incentive for one participant to control
the behavior of the other. Shared right of control makes it possible for
her to do so relatively cheaply. Whenever the combination of incentive
and right to control the debtor makes the other participant the
cheaper bearer of risk of loss (relative to the creditor), imputed liabil-
ity tends to be the efficient allocation.133
A creditor can argue that even though two people are not partners
in a common enterprise, one of them authorized the other to act as her
agent with respect to a particular risky activity. Absent evidence of
an express agreement as to actual authority between principal and
agent,13 4 a court can find authority by implication (apparent author-
ity) based on the perspective of the creditor who deals with the di-
rectly liable person (the actor).' 3 5 The principal is vicariously liable
for the actor's conduct if the creditor reasonably believed the actor had
authority to act on her behalf and the creditor's belief is "traceable to a
132. An association is a partnership if the participants are carrying on a for profit
business as co-owners. Id. §§ 101(6), 202, at 61, 92-93. Bromberg & Ribstein
observe that the shared ownership and control test is more subtle than it ap-
pears. Profit sharing is "probably the most important element" whereas shared
right to control is "also important" but "somewhat more elusive because of the
many gradations of control and because partners often delegate decision-making
power." BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 2, § 2.07.
133. E.g., BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 2, § 4.07(a) n.1; R. H. Coase, The Nature
of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937), reprinted in READINGS IN PRICE THEORY 331
(George J. Stigler & Kenneth E. Boulding eds., 1952) (explaining the relative effi-
ciency of a firm in which agent/managers allocate resources by allocation of dis-
cretion among collaborators rather than through discrete market transactions
with third parties); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.04 cmt. b (2006)
("A principal's opportunity to monitor an agent and create incentives for the
proper handling of information warrant[s] imputing an agent's knowledge to the
principal even when the agent has breached duties of disclosure to the
principal.").
134. A principal grants actual authority to an agent by a "manifestation ... that, as
reasonably understood by the agent, expresses the principal's assent that the
agent take action on the principal's behalf." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY
§ 3.01 (2006).
135. Id. § 2.03. Apparent authority arises by inference from a person's "manifestation
that another has authority to act with legal consequences [for him], when a third
party reasonably believes the actor to be authorized and the belief is traceable to
the manifestation." Id. § 3.03.
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manifestation of the principal."1 36 The drafters of the Restatement
(Third) of Agency note that apparent authority aligns the private rela-
tionship between the principal and agent with the impression they
give reasonable observers. "A principal may not choose to act through
agents whom it has clothed with the trappings of authority and then
determine at a later time whether the consequences of their acts offer
an advantage." 137
An alternative argument for imputed agency by implication is
agency by estoppel or ratification.13 8 One party cannot deny that the
other acted as her agent if she: 1) failed to use ordinary care to control
the other party; 2) that failure enabled the other party to create a rea-
sonable misperception of agency in a third party; and 3) the third
party changed its position in reliance on that misperception. 13 9
Shared liability by ratification implements restitutionary principles.
One person may be liable for another if she knows about, and accepts,
the benefits of the other person's act with knowledge after the fact. 140
136. Id. § 2.03 cmt. c. A "manifestation" includes written or spoken words and other
conduct that expresses meaning. Id. § 1.03 cmt. b. If a principal voluntarily
manifests intention to create an agency or assent to another's agency for him, the
manifestation is effective to support an inference of apparent authority even if
the principal made the manifestation negligently or mistakenly. Id.§ 1.03 cmt. d.
"The relevant state of mind is that of the person who observes or otherwise learns
of the manifestation." Id. § 1.03 cmt. b.
137. Id. § 2.03 cmt. c. Restatement (Third) of Agency § 3.03 cmt. c (2006) states:
Apparent authority is an essential adjunct to actual authority in ena-
bling third parties to deal effectively with organizations .... [It] enables
persons who interact with the organization to treat the agent's act or
statement as dispositive, without further inquiry directed elsewhere
within the organization, in the absence of circumstances suggestive of
self-dealing or other irregularity.
One person's silence and inaction with knowledge that another person purports
to act for his benefit may constitute a manifestation sufficient to justify imposi-
tion of vicarious liability on him whenever the third party reasonably believed
the principal acquiesced in the directly liable person's actions. See id. § 3.03 cmt.
b.
138. The difference between liability based on authority by implication and liability
based on ratification or estoppel is that the latter does not require a manifesta-
tion of authority on the part of the vicariously liable person to the third party.
139. Id. § 2.05. Vicarious liability based on estoppel, also known as ostensible author-
ity, recognizes that one person (the principal) can become liable for the acts of
another based on the principal's failure to exercise ordinary care. The principal's
own failure to use ordinary care "enables the agent, or an actor who purports to
be an agent, to misrepresent the agent's authority . . . ." Id. § 2.05 cmt. d.
140. See id. § 4.01 (defining ratification). A person ratifies the act of another by "man-
ifesting assent" or by "conduct that justifies a reasonable assumption that the
person so consents." Id. § 4.01(2). A principal must have knowledge (not just
notice) of the facts of the act he ratifies. A person may lose his right to raise his
lack of knowledge of the facts as a defense to ratification, if after learning of the
facts, he retains the benefits of the transaction with knowledge of the facts. See
id. § 4.06; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 164 (1981) (a party
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Such a person will be treated as though she authorized both the re-
ward and the risk of his action before the fact.141
The easiest statement to make about the existence and scope of
marital partnership or agency is also the most general. Marital status
alone does not establish that spouses intend to share ownership, con-
trol, and risk of all property interests held by either of them as part-
ners. It does not establish a mutual agency such that the act of one is
always the act of both.142 Yet, like any two legally distinct individu-
als, one spouse can act as agent for the other. Although the couple's
marital status is not dispositive, a couple's financial integration and
behavior within the context of their marriage is relevant to determin-
ing the existence and scope of an implied partnership or agency be-
tween them. 143
Some common themes appear in marital agency cases. First, it is
clear that marriage matters. Some courts continue to recognize the
distinction between "simply married" and "also partners" that the Su-
preme Court raised in the income tax cases. They differentiate be-
tween the ordinary financial integration typical between
entrepreneurial partners (which supports imputation of liability) and
marital integration (which does not). For these courts, sharing of
ownership and control of assets is consistent with the couple's inten-
tion to be married. It does not support an inference of their shared
intention to manage an investment or business together as a
partnership. 14 4
For example in Barmes v. LR.S.,145 the court considered an em-
ployee withholding tax dispute arising from the operation of a gift
may avoid a contract based on material misrepresentation if the party is justified
in relying on the misrepresentation).
141. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 4.01 cmt. b. ("[Riatification is both an act
and a set of effects."). Under some circumstances, a person may be estopped to
deny ratification of the acts of another as against a third party who has relied on
the ratification to his detriment. Id. § 4.08.
142. E.g., Ryan v. Rademacher, 142 S.W.3d 846 (Mo. Ct. Ap. 2004); Ellsworth v. Am.
Arbitration Ass'n, 148 P.3d 983 (Utah 2006).
143. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Garrett, 783 N.E.2d 329 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (indi-
cating that marriage does not in itself create an agency relationship between
spouses; however, the marital relationship is one of facts and circumstances to be
considered in determining the existence of an agency relationship); Nwannunu v.
Weichman & Associates, P.C., 770 N.E.2d 871 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (same); Na-
tionwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Prioleau, 597 S.E.2d 165 (S.C. Ct. App. 2004).
144. See, e.g., Bayes v. Isenberg, 429 N.E.2d 654, 659 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) (indicating
that to establish an agency relationship, "the evidence must be clear and satisfac-
tory and sufficiently strong to explain and remove the equivocal character.., of
the marital relation[ship]"); Ogallala Fertilizer Co. v. Salsbery, 186 Neb. 537, 184
N.W.2d 729, 730 (1971) (partnership between husband and wife was disputed
question of fact where wife's participation in farming business was consistent
with spouses' mutual marital duties of support and service).
145. 116 F. Supp. 2d 1007 (S.D. Ind. 2000).
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shop business. 146 "[W]ith respect to a husband and wife, co-ownership
of property and the sharing of business profits do not demonstrate a
partnership because those arrangements are common in mar-
riages."147 Because Mrs. Barmes was not Mr. Barmes' partner, but
was merely his wife, she was not personally liable for the business's
withholding tax debt. 148 Absent evidence that Mrs. Barmes "helped to
run the business," the court treated the tax liability as exclusively Mr.
Barmes's and protected Mrs. Barmes and property titled in her name
from IRS recourse.149
The unexplored issue in cases like Barmes v. I.R.S. is how a court
is to determine whether a couple is "simply married" or "also partners"
for purposes of imputed liability. What kind of interaction between
spouses divides ordinary marital sharing from a partnership? Marital
agency cases reveal no clear line. Instead, courts evaluate each
couple's behavior against an unspoken norm of socially desirable mar-
ital behavior. At some point, a couple's relationship stops looking like
"just marriage," and begins to look like strategic wealth-shielding only
incidentally accomplished within a marriage.
For example, in In re Tsurukawa,150 the debtor's husband set up a
corporation in her name and used it to defraud his employer of more
than $2 million. She executed corporate and bank documents in
which she identified herself as the sole owner of the corporation. She
wrote checks on the corporate bank account and used the corporate
credit card for family expenses.151 The couple used the fraud proceeds
to buy two additional houses and new cars.' 5 2 After the fraud victim
146. Id. at 1009. The IRS asserted liens against both spouses individually on the the-
ory that Barbara's Gift Shop was a partnership between the spouses and that
both spouses were individually as its general partners. The Barmes challenged
the IRS liens against Mrs. Barmes on grounds that Mr. Barmes was the sole
owner of Barbara's Gift Shop. Id. at 1013.
147. Id. at 1013.
148. "[T]hat she is her husband's wife is not enough." Id. at 1014. In an earlier case,
an Indiana court gave some indication of the kind of involvement that might sup-
port an inference of partnership between spouses. Soley v. VanKeppel, 656
N.E.2d 508 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that plaintiff in dram shop liability case
raised material issue of fact as to whether husband and wife operated saloon as
partners; wife was co-owner of saloon property, worked at the bar and held her-
self out as a co-owner to vendors, but liquor license, operating permit, food service
license, retail merchant certificate and tax returns were in husband's name as
sole proprietor).
149. Barmes, 116 F. Supp. 2d at 1012. In Johnson v. Wiley, 613 N.E.2d 446, 451 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1993), a husband and wife were partners in a real estate business. The
court applied what it called a "duck test" to determine the legal nature of the
Johnson's relationship: "[Tihe Johnsons acted like partners, worked like part-
ners, and shared profits/losses as partners." Id.
150. 287 B.R. 515 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2002).
151. Id. at 518-19.
152. Id. at 519.
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obtained a judgment against the couple,153 the wife filed for bank-
ruptcy. The victim objected to her discharge.154 The debtor argued
that her husband's fraud should not be imputed to her because she
and her husband were not business partners. 155 She claimed her hus-
band ran the business; she was merely a "figurehead."156
The Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel held that she was
her husband's partner, not just his wife.15 7 It noted that evidence of
sharing of ownership and control between married people can be am-
biguous.15 8 Finding partnership between spouses too easily would in-
hibit socially valuable marital sharing. In this case, however, an
inference of partnership (and imputed liability) would not "unfairly
affect the marital community."159 The debtor spouse held herself out
to the fraud victim as the owner of the corporation through which the
husband worked his fraud. She performed "substantial activities" for
the business, and "assumed an active role . . .that [went] beyond
merely holding a community property interest in her husband's busi-
ness ...."160
The court could have reached the same result by reasoning back-
ward. The Tsurukawas were partners because their behavior was na-
ked wealth-shielding and beyond the scope of socially valuable marital
153. Id. Under California law, the judgment was community debt. Id. at 519 n.4.
154. Under Bankruptcy Code § 523(a)(2), a claim for certain kinds of financial fraud is
nondischargeable. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2) (2006). See generally Bernice B. Donald,
Fraud Imputation Under Section 523(a)(2)(A): Is a Partner Always Liable for
Wrongdoing by the Partnership?, 24 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 651 (1994).
155. In re Tsuruskawa, 287 B.R. at 521.
156. Id. In support of being having no control:
Debtor maintained that she could not question or direct her husband's
business affairs because she was "simply a homemaker and mother; it
was not her station in life to delve into [the husband's] job or his busi-
ness," and she "was never in any position to dictate what he could or
could not do."
Id.
157. The bankruptcy court held Mrs. Tsurukawa's debt to be nondischargable. The
Ninth Circuit B.A.P. reversed on grounds that under California law, a marital
relationship alone was insufficient to justify imputation of the husband's fraud to
the wife. On remand, the bankruptcy court held the wife and husband were part-
ners and imputed his fraud liability to her. The B.A.P. affirmed. Id. at 518.
158. The B.A.P. court noted that:
[Ilt is not appropriate to find an agency relationship in every instance in
which a spouse takes bare legal title to business property held for the
benefit of the couple ... where one spouse performs minor services for a
business run by the other spouse .... [or where] spouses share the prof-
its of an enterprise, because under community property law a husband
and wife generally share the profits of a business managed by either
spouse.
Id. at 522.
159. Id. at 524.
160. Id. at 522-23.
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cooperation.161 Alternatively, the court could have decided the case
based on agency between husband and wife, without finding a marital
partnership. It could have held Mrs. Tsurukawa liable for her hus-
band's fraud on grounds that she authorized his fraudulent conduct by
ratification. 16 2 The legal question posed by this argument is whether
she accepted the benefits of his fraudulent conduct with sufficient
knowledge so that his liability should be imputed to her. The level of
knowledge that is sufficient for this purpose varies among jurisdic-
tions. Some courts impute one spouse's fraud liability to the other
based on ratification only if the other retains the benefits with actual
knowledge of the fraud. 163 Others presume the requisite knowledge of
the fraud on proof of circumstances that would have put a reasonable
person on inquiry as to the source of the benefit.164
In Tsurukawa, the wife charged hundreds of thousands of dollars
on the corporate credit card and checking account and dramatically
improved her family's standard of living.165 The court noted that
under California law, "persons who reap the benefits of a partnership
must also be subject to its liabilities."166 So too, a spouse who receives
161. See, e.g., Ins. Agents v. Zimmerman, 381 N.W.2d 218, 220 (S.D. 1986) (finding
partnership between husband and wife for purpose of their joint liability for in-
surance premiums in part because the couple had reorganized their business
through a series of name changes in a way "not designed to help creditors trace
assets").
162. See supra text accompanying notes 138-41. E.g., Lusher v. Sparks, 122 S.E.2d
609 (W. Va. 1961) (wife who shared in proceeds of sale of real property owned by
the couple as joint tenants shared liability for husband's fraudulent misrepresen-
tation to vendee).
163. E.g., Lissau v. Smith, 138 A.2d 381, 386 (Md. 1958) (indicating that the wife "not
only did not authorize the option, but she did not know of it and her acceptance of
the rent was entirely consistent with her belief that the tenancy was a monthly
one"); Schenectady Trust Co. v. Castelli, 209 N.Y.S.2d 739, 742 (Schenectady City
Ct. 1960) (holding that "[a]cceptance of the benefit of improvements ... without
knowledge of the execution of the instrument cannot by any inference indicate a
ratification of this unknown act or any implication of authority to the
defendant").
164. E.g., Stegeman v. Vandeventer, 135 P.2d 186 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1943); Smith v.
Merrit Sav. & Loan, Inc., 295 A.2d 474 (Md. 1972) (husband liable for agent wife
on mortgage document who forged his signature; husband used proceeds of mort-
gage to purchase a gun rack, pool table and other personal property specially
adapted to his use); Murphy v. Olds, 508 S.W.2d 249 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974).
165. In re Tsurukawa, 287 B.R. at 524.
166. Id. In In re Copeland, 291 B.R. 740 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2003), the court held that
husband and wife were partners in a cheesecake business, id. at 771-79, but the
wife could nonetheless discharge any vicarious liability in her bankruptcy case
because the husband's fraud was not in the ordinary course of partnership busi-
ness. Id. at 779 (citing to the test from In re Ledford, 970 F.2d 1556, 1561-62
(6th Cir. 1992), concerning imputation to the debtor in bankruptcy cases involv-
ing non-dischargeable vicarious liability for fraud between partners). The court
did not consider that the husband and wife may have expressly or impliedly au-
thorized her husband to act for their partnership in connection with the bakery
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a financial benefit as extraordinary as the millions at issue in
Tsurukawa has sufficient knowledge of a fraud so that if she shares
the booty without objection, she ought to share liability as well.
Contrast Zickgraf Hardwood Co. v. Seay.167 The plaintiff sued a
husband and wife for building supplies the husband purchased on
credit for use in a contracting business.168 The wife knew the hus-
band bought supplies on credit. She enjoyed a share of income from
the building business. Yet, the court held she was not vicariously lia-
ble for the debt. In this setting, the couple's sharing of the risk and
reward of the business was simply marriage and not partnership.16 9
"The fact that money generated by the building business provided
Mrs. Seay and the Seay children with their support and income ....
shows only that Mrs. Seay received the maintenance and support
which she was entitled to receive from her husband under the law."170
Her failure to disaffirm his debt did not constitute ratification.l 7 1
In a case involving a passive and trusting husband, Schenectady
Trust Co. v. Castelli,172 the court held that he did not knowingly ac-
cept the benefits of a home improvement contract on which his wife
had forged his signature. 173 Although the husband was aware his
wife had contracted for the improvements and stood by silently when
sale transaction, or that the wife knowingly ratified the transaction even though
it was outside the ordinary scope of partnership business. In re Copeland, 291
B.R. at 779.
167. Seay, 298 S.E.2d 208 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982).
168. The husband was a building contractor and the wife worked part time in the
office. Id. at 210.
169. See id. The court also rejected the plaintiffs partnership argument because Mrs.
Seay had no independent control over the affairs of the building business. "At
most the evidence shows that Mrs. Seay was an employee of her husband who
performed mainly secretarial and bookkeeping tasks at his direction." Id. at 211.
But see Wike v. Wike, 445 S.E.2d 406, 407 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994) (former wife was
partner of former husband in landscaping business where wife contributed capi-
tal, labor and management).
170. 298 S.E.2d at 211.
171. Similarly, in Camp v. Leonard, 515 S.E.2d 909 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999), new home
buyers sued the builder and his wife for breach of contract. The wife signed the
deed along with her husband to convey the real property, but she was neither
actively involved in her husband's construction business nor his partner. Id. at
912. The court found that she was entitled to summary judgment because the
buyers did not prove that she benefited from the lot sale or building contract
other than in her capacity as wife. Id.; e.g., Barmes v. I.R.S., 116 F. Supp. 2d
1007, 1013 (S.D. Ind. 2000) (under Indiana law, co-ownership of property and
sharing of profits from a business do not justify finding partnership between hus-
band and wife because "those arrangements are common in marriages").
172. 209 N.Y.S.2d 739 (Schenectady City Ct. 1960).
173. Id. at 742 (stating that the important point was not that he knew that certain
home improvements were taking place, but that he lacked knowledge concerning
the execution of the notes). See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 4.06
cmt. d (2006) (knowledge requisite to ratification of agency and the risk of lack of
knowledge).
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the contractor worked, the court held that he did not know his spouse
incurred liability on his behalf. When the couple discussed the im-
provements and the husband asked whether they could afford them,
his wife told him "not to worry about the money."174 Without explana-
tion, the court vaidated the husband's trust in his wife. The creditor
was left with no right to foreclose on the husband's interest in their
property.175
The conflict between social policy that protects marital collabora-
tive behavior and that which enforces creditors' rights appears starkly
in tenancy by the entirety cases. Recall that a creditor with the per-
sonal liability of only one spouse cannot force partition of tenancy by
entirety property except by imputing liability to the other spouse. 176
If the other spouse has expressly or impliedly consented to the debt,
however, both are personally liable and their tenancy by the entirety
property is subject to the creditors' recourse.
Tests for marital agency between tenants by the entirety vary
among jurisdictions. Under Pennsylvania law, if both spouses benefit
from the debt, either spouse is presumptively the agent for the other.
This treatment is similar to community property jurisdictions that af-
ford creditor recourse to community property based on whether the
debt was incurred for the benefit of the community. 177 In contrast,
Missouri law does not presume agency between spouses. Rather, to
establish agency, a creditor must prove the knowledge and active par-
ticipation of the passive spouse in the liability producing transac-
tion.' 78 New York and Florida, also tenancy by the entirety states,
174. Castelli, 209 N.Y.S.2d at 742.
175. Id. But see Lyons v. Jones, 121 S.W.2d 125 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1938) (holding wife
responsible for husband's alteration of promissory note to pay for home improve-
ments; although she had no knowledge of the alteration, she enjoyed the
improvements).
176. See supra text accompanying notes 22-24.
177. E.g., Miller v. Benjamin Coal Co., 625 A.2d 66, 68 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (when one
spouse acts to affect title to entirety's property, no agency is implied or presumed,
but in other cases, one spouse is presumed agent for both when act benefits both
spouses and no evidence negates or limits spouse's authority); see also Schmidt v.
Matilsky, 490 So. 2d 237, 238 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (finding that an estate by
the entirety can be transferred only by the joint deed of both spouses, except if
such a transfer "(1) does not adversely affect the interest of the other spouse and
(2) is done with the full knowledge, assent and acquiescence of such other
spouse").
178. See McCarthy v. Wahby, 717 S.W.2d 571, 572-73 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (wife is not
vicariously liable unless her participation in the transaction respecting entirety
property "rises to the level where she is in control .. .and she participates in
decisions relative to construction"); Turner v. Hoffmeier, 690 S.W.2d 188, 189
(Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (stating that the creditor must show "joint participation" of
the spouses in the transaction, demonstrated by knowledge and active involve-
ment). Apparently disregarding the usual requirement of knowing participation
by the non-debtor spouse, a bankruptcy court applying Missouri law found
agency because of the absence of any knowledge of or participation by the passive
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find implied consent or agency by ratification if the non-debtor spouse
knows or should know about the liability producing transaction, but
does not repudiate it.179
Whether one spouse incurs credit card debt with the implied con-
sent of the other spouse similarly varies depending on the law of the
jurisdiction whose law governs the contract. Only a few reported opin-
ions consider the extent to which a court may impute one spouse's
credit card debt to the other. One reason might be that credit card
issuers can easily obtain the personal liability of both spouses by bar-
gain. They do not present as compelling a case for imputed liability as
tort and tax creditors who cannot bargain in advance for the liability
of both spouses. For example, in Providan National Bank v. Ebarb,180
the court found that evidence that the husband occasionally paid the
wife's monthly credit card bill "did not establish his approval, full
knowledge, or intent to assume personal liability for the debt [his
wife] had incurred."181 Note also that in some jurisdictions, credit
card debt incurred for "necessary" or "family" expenses may fall under
statutory or common law doctrine that make both spouses liable for
such expenses incurred by either of them as an incident of marital
status, without regard to agency.182
spouse. Kinney v. United Mo. Bank, 16 B.R. 664 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1981). The
court held that the couple's "long course of conduct" in which the husband man-
aged the farm and the wife took care of the house justified a finding that she
acquiesced in her husband's conduct as her agent for purposes of his authority to
encumber farm equipment held by the entirety. Id. at 665 ("If this long course of
conduct is not sufficient to change the character of the entirety property [to the
husband's separate property] . . . it at least amounts to [the wife's] knowingly
permitting [the husband] to act as her agent in encumbering [the tractor]."). But
see In re Davison, 29 B.R. 987 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1983) (bankruptcy trustee avoids
creditor's lien in debtors' retail inventory held as tenants by entirety where
debtor wife did not sign financing statement).
179. See Parrish v. Swearington, 379 So. 2d 185, 185-86 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980)
(consent of the other spouse to a conveyance of tenancy by entirety property may
be inferred from the conduct of the other spouse such as being "a party to, partici-
pating in, or [knowing] of the conveyance of the property held in the entireties");
Jill Real Estate, Inc. v. Smyles, 541 N.Y.S.2d 515, 517 (App. Div. 1989) (New
York law) ("Where a party who holds land as a tenant by the entirety, with
knowledge or sufficient notice of her rights, freely does what amounts to recogni-
tion or adoption of a contract, or acts in any manner inconsistent with its repudi-
ation, the party is thereafter equitably estopped from avoiding it.").
180. 180 S.W.3d 898 (Tex. App. 2005).
181. Id. at 901-02 (The trial judge may have concluded that the husband's subsequent
awareness of the credit card account and payment of some of the monthly bills
did not establish agency by ratification.).
182. See discussion supra text accompanying notes 115-16.
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IV. THE EFFECT OF CHANGE IN MARRIAGE ON MARITAL
AGENCY: SOME OBSERVATIONS
Legislative reform to marriage that recognized married women's
separate estate could not be confined solely to de jure property rights
for married women. It launched a long and continuing process by
which courts reconcile the effect of spouses' marriage on their relation-
ships with creditors.
In the last quarter of the twentieth century, marriage changed
again to reflect a relatively abrupt change in the political and eco-
nomic status of women.18 3 Marriage no longer strips women of their
legal capacity as individuals or subordinates their voice in the man-
agement of property. Yet, it has not become just another form of unin-
corporated association. As we have seen, a debtor's marital status
affects his credit relationships. The doctrine of necessaries and family
expense statutes impose shared liability on spouses. And married
people are subject to property regimes and rules regarding imputed
liability that are distinct from those that apply to non-marital associa-
tions. From the perspective of some observers, recent developments in
the evolution of marriage may appear to have made it indistinguish-
able from assent based partnership. From creditors' perspective, how-
ever, marriage remains notably different than non-marital
collaboration.
It is easy to use the metaphor of marriage as a partnership to de-
scribe the relationship between the spouses. Applied to individual
spouses' obligations to third parties, however, the label "partners"
proves an uncomfortable fit for several reasons. First, two person
partnerships present an inescapable governance problem-dead-
lock.l84 Absent contrary agreement, partnership law generally im-
poses majority rule for breaking deadlock.185 Two person
partnerships, however, cannot resolve disputes by a majority vote, as
there is no majority. Once the partners agree on the ground rules for
183. MARY ANN GLENDON, THE NEW FAMILY AND THE NEW PROPERTY 14-15 (1981)
(noting the ascendancy of "companionate marriage" to facilitate individual
spouses' goals and the decline of marriage as a matter of social order, status and
property).
184. See, e.g., Seligson v. Russo, 792 N.Y.S.2d 34, 35 (App. Div. 2005) ("In light of the
50-50 deadlock between the parties and the consequent inability of the partner-
ship to make any decisions, it was equitable to dissolve this partnership .. .");
Krulwich v. Posner, 738 N.Y.S.2d 315, 316 (App. Div. 2002) (holding the partner-
ship dissolved because of "the irreconcilable dissension between the two equal
partners").
185. See BROMBERG & RiBSTEIN, supra note 2, § 6.03(b). See also UNIF. P'SHIP. ACT
§ 18, 6 U.L.A. 101 (1914) (equal management rights subject to agreement); RE-
VISED UNIF. P'sHiP. ACT § 401, 6 U.L.A. 133 (1997) (equal management rights);




partnership operations, one partner cannot unilaterally change them,
short of dissolution of the partnership. 8 6 For example, suppose
spouses agree on an ordinary course in which one partner can incur
liability for a certain range of projects on behalf of both. The partner
with authority can continue to incur liability on behalf of the partner-
ship within that ordinary course, even though the other partner
changes his or her mind and would prefer to retract the initial
authorization. 18 7
Until the last part of the twentieth century, the deadlock problem
was not much of a problem in marital relationships. By both law and
custom, one spouse-the wife (with some exceptions)-was excluded
from the legal right to make decisions or take action on behalf of both
spouses. Even after married women's property reform, courts were re-
luctant to find partnership or agency between spouses who did not
legally or practically share control over risk.'8 8 Under modern mar-
riage, however, husbands no longer legally dominate wives in manage-
ment decisions. Yet, no "tie-breaking" rule has emerged to replace the
old "man-wins" rule. Instead, courts employ agency doctrine to deter-
mine, on a case by case basis, whether one spouse acted individually
or as agent for the other within the scope of their shared enterprise.
A marital relationship is also different from a non-marital partner-
ship on the issue of scope. A non-marital partnership typically has an
express or relatively discernable business purpose and an "ordinary
course" that marks the boundary between partners' common enter-
prise and their individual pursuits. The action of a partner within the
scope of this ordinary course is an act of the partnership for which
both partners are individually liable. In contrast, the scope of a mari-
tal partnership is hard for a stranger to the marriage to see. Marriage
encompasses the range of human activity we think of as "personal." It
embraces a multitude of overlapping projects, including home mainte-
nance, child-rearing and management of financial affairs. It is not
limited to a discernable, finite, profit-oriented objective such as devel-
oping a shopping mall or operating a law practice. Indeed, when mar-
186. The inability of one partner to unilaterally retract mutual authority distin-
guishes a two person partnership from an agency relationship between two peo-
ple. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 118-119 (1958) (a principal may
retract authority of an agent to act in a particular manner at any time). A person
who is an agent for another person, but not a partner with him, acts for the exclu-
sive benefit of the principal and is therefore subject to the principal's unilateral
control. In contrast, a partner is an agent for the partnership in which he or she
shares an interest, and only an act of the partnership can retract his agency.
187. BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 2, §§ 4.02 nn.80-82, 6.03(c)(1). See generally
Saul Levmore, Love It or Leave It: Property Rules, Liability Rules and Exclusivity
of Remedies in Partnership and Marriage, 58 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 221,
225-26 (1995).
188. BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 2, § 6.03(b); e.g., Sweet v. Morrison, 8 N.E. 396
(N.Y. 1886).
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ried people coincidentally undertake such a discrete financial project
together, we tend to isolate the project as their "business" as distinct
from their "marriage." Moreover, the ordinary course of non-marital
partnerships is stable compared to the ordinary course of a marriage,
which can change from moment to moment in ways that are difficult
for a creditor to perceive. Detecting the presence of an agency rela-
tionship or the existence of a partnership (and shared liability) in non-
marital cases is difficult enough. Cases are highly fact specific and
difficult to reconcile within, or across, jurisdictions. Adding marriage
to the mix only adds to the complexity.
In practical terms, the challenge for courts is to navigate the wide
sea between two extremes. On the one hand, treating all marriages as
partnerships and all conduct of either spouse as on behalf of the part-
nership would reinstate Blackstone's merger model for marriage. It
would also negate an important political and economic function of
married women's property reform-the ability of spouses to shield
some of their joint investment in marriage from an individual spouse's
creditors' reach. On the other hand, treating all conduct of either
spouse as entirely individual, with no possibility of agency or imputed
liability, both ignores the collaborative reality of marriage and encour-
ages inefficient wealth-shielding conduct.
The course between the two extremes requires courts to interpret
and draw inferences regarding the reasonableness of spouses' conduct
against an archetype of marriage. The archetype of reasonable mari-
tal behavior reflects the courts' sense of prevailing social and legal ex-
pectations arising from marital status. Marital partnership is sui
generis in part, perhaps, because collaboration within marriage has a
long and persistent social function distinct from non-marital collabo-
rative forms. In their treatise on partnership law, Alan Bromberg and
Lawrence Ribstein note that the courts' challenge in detecting a part-
nership between married people is that "aspects of the relationship
that would otherwise resemble partnership take on a different colora-
tion in the family setting."1 8 9 The marital relationship, and norms
about what conduct is socially valuable and therefore reasonable be-
tween spouses, colors its legal characterization for purposes of im-
puted liability.
The persistent special treatment of marriage for purposes of im-
puted liability inescapably reveals much about the legal meaning and
social value of marriage. This function of marital agency is disturbing
for some observers who prefer to view marital status as no more than
a sentimental label. For example, some observers see the doctrine of
necessaries and family expense statutes as serving no purpose other
189. BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 2, § 2.10. The same ambiguity appears when
the basis of imputed liability is not partnership but agency.
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than as "collection devices" for creditors.190 This criticism rests on the
unspoken premise that marriage has no external effect or social value
other than as an expression of the individual spouses' private agree-
ment. The persistence of a sphere of marital collaboration shielded
from shared liability under modern legal and economic conditions
strongly suggests that marriage, as a collaborative form, retains a
unique social value.
Marital agency cases make it clear that courts continue to recog-
nize the unique social value of the stability of marital relationships.
Even after mid-nineteenth century reform, marriage remained dis-
tinct from non-marital partnership by its nearly mandatory term-till
death do us part. In the last quarter of the twentieth century, divorce
law reform afforded spouses a right to dissolve a marriage more
closely akin to a non-marital partner's right to dissolve a partnership.
As divorce becomes less costly for a financially dependent spouse, the
threat of divorce during marriage logically becomes a more effective
lever to control the other spouse's behavior.19 1 Yet, even under a no-
190. See Melissa B. Jacoby and Elizabeth Warren, Beyond Hospital Misbehavior: An
Alternative Account of Medical- Related Financial Distress, 100 Nw. U. L. REV.
535, 565 (2006) (noting that litigation involving the doctrine of necessaries is
dominated by medical services creditors); Shawn M. Willson, Comment, Abrogat-
ing the Doctrine of Necessaries in Florida: The Future of Spousal Liability for
Necessary Expenses After Connor v. Southwest Florida Regional Medical Center,
Inc., 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1031, 1043 (1997) (application of the doctrine is unre-
lated to a spouse's failure to provide basic financial support for a spouse). As part
of the movement toward legal equality for women, some jurisdictions abrogated
the doctrine of necessaries on equal protection or other grounds. See, e.g., N. Ot-
tawa Cmty. Hosp. v. Kieft, 578 N.W.2d 267, 273 (Mich. 1998) (abrogating the
necessaries doctrine and holding that "neither a husband nor a wife is liable,
absent express agreement, for necessaries supplied to the other"); Schilling v.
Bedford County Mem'l Hosp., Inc., 303 S.E.2d 905, 908 (Va. 1983) (holding that
the necessaries doctrine "creates a gender-based classification not substantially
related to serving important governmental interests and is unconstitutional");
Med. Ctr. Hosp. v. Lorrain, 675 A.2d 1326, 1329 (Vt. 1996) (indicating that the
necessaries doctrine violates equal protection, and opting to abolish the doctrine
rather than extending the doctrine to both husband and wife); Marcus L. Moxley,
Survey, North Carolina Baptist Hospitals, Inc. v. Harris: North Carolina Adopts
a Gender-Neutral Approach to the Doctrine of Necessaries, 66 N.C. L. REV. 1241,
1246-48 (1988) (discussing the four approaches used to modify the doctrine of
necessaries and noting that North Carolina had opted to "extend the doctrine of
necessaries to apply equally to both spouses").
191. The possibility of divorce at the option of either spouse creates an incentive for
spouses to act for the account of the other. If the spouse with control over shared
assets acts inconsistently with his marital mutual agency, he risks an adjust-
ment against his individual interests at divorce in the other spouse's favor based
on "financial fraud," "dissipation," or "mismanagement." See, e.g., Lewis Becker,
Conduct of a Spouse that Dissipates Property Available for Equitable Property
Distribution: A Suggested Analysis, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 95, 97-98, 111-16 (1991)
(explaining how courts adjust equitable distributive shares to account for dissipa-
tion and observing how courts appear to identify dissipation on an ad hoc basis).
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fault, equitable distribution divorce regime, marriage remains distinct
from non-marital partnership for purposes of imputed liability. Put
another way, courts do not find a spouse financially responsible for
her choice of spouse under the same standards that would apply to a
non-marital partner's choice of partner.
The reason for this may be that terminating a marriage is not anal-
ogous to termination of a non-marital partnership. In a case of dead-
lock, ending the marriage is the only legally effective mechanism to
end risk of shared liability to third parties. Divorce yields negative
effects, especially to children, that the dissolution of business partner-
ships does not.
Until the late twentieth century, marital status may have been a
useful heuristic for socially valuable investment in child rearing. And
investment in child-rearing activity (given women's alternatives) re-
quired economic specialization within marriage. Women tended to
specialize in child care which rendered them and their children physi-
cally and economically dependent on men. Under these conditions,
women had little choice but to trust and defer to husbands' financial
decisions. Under this one-size-fits-all model for marriage, it was pos-
sible to identify "ordinary" marital behavior, and to hold up ordinary
behavior in the face of ordinary vulnerability as justification for a pro-
tective imputed liability rule for trusting, deferential wives. 19 2
Today, marriage is no longer the sole legal locus for child rearing.
Nor are women as dependent on men to support and protect them and
their children. Yet, the marital relationship remains sui generis for
purposes of shared liability to third parties. Put simply, despite
change in economic conditions and divorce law, courts continue to ex-
pect marriages to last beyond deadlock over asset management strat-
egy. This view is evident in marital agency cases, even if it is fading
or absent in legal discourse about divorce. For example, when a credi-
tor seeks to impute liability to the other spouse based on agency by
ratification, a court may discount the spouse's failure to prevent the
risky behavior by threatening divorce because it views her threat of
192. See WILLIAM J. DOHERTY ET AL., WHY MARRIAGE MATTERS: TWENTY-ONE CONCLU-
SIONS FROM THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 8-9 (Inst. for Am. Values 2002) (marriage
across cultures is fundamentally a reproductive alliance); Maggie Gallagher,
(How) Will Gay Marriage Weaken Marriage as a Social Institution: A Reply to
Andrew Koppelman, 2 U. ST. THOMAS L. REV. 33, 46 (2004) ("Marriage intrinsi-
cally aims at an enduring, exclusive, sexual union between a man and a woman,
because managing the procreative consequences of human sexual attraction is at
the core of its reason for existence."); Elizabeth S. Scott, Marriage, Cohabitation




divorce as a socially undesirable tool of control over the other
spouse.193
When a spouse's behavior appears to the court as reasonable be-
havior within the context of marriage, the court will characterize her
failure to monitor, control, or repudiate the conduct of the other
spouse as appropriate and ordinary marital trust and deference. In
other words, this type of deferential behavior is characteristic of what
married people should do. However, when the court characterizes a
spouse's behavior as unreasonably deferential, the couple's private al-
location of assets and risk will appear as "judgment-proofing," or less
pejoratively "asset protection."194 Rather than determine the exis-
tence and scope of marital agency directly, courts appear to reason
backward from the desired result. Thus, a spouse who trusts and de-
fers to a fraudulent spouse is protected from shared liability to his
creditor (no agency) whenever such behavior is "merely" marriage-
that is-consistent with the archetypal, reasonable marital relation-
ship. The effect of protection from shared liability in such a case en-
courages such behavior between spouses by subsidy at the expense of
a creditor.195 Under other circumstances, one spouse's trust of, and
deference to, the other appears unnecessary and unrelated to the so-
cial value of marriage. Under these conditions, the court finds an
agency relationship, and the trusting spouse shares the risk of loss the
other spouse's conduct creates as a partner would.
The challenge for courts in imputed marital liability cases is to dis-
tinguish socially valuable conduct between spouses from opportunistic
wealth-shielding behavior. This is a daunting task. Whose perception
should govern? The spouses deny that one acted on behalf of the
other. The creditor, who is a stranger to their marriage, must con-
struct the inference to be drawn from their relationship notwithstand-
193. A court might find that a spouse who chooses to remain married and silent rather
than confront her spouse and provoke inevitable deadlock over his conduct has
not impliedly authorized or ratified her husband's conduct by her silence. E.g.,
Zickgraf Hardwood Co. v. Seay, 298 S.E.2d 208 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982).
194. Twenty first century families exploit wealth shielding options unknown to their
nineteenth century counterparts. Indeed, marriage as a wealth-shielding strat-
egy has notably declined in utility as marriage has become increasingly transi-
tory. Modern asset protection strategies involve creation of limited liability
partnerships or other entities to hold "family" wealth legally separate from the
family members who control it and their creditors. E.g., Mario A. Mata, Asset
Protection Planning for the Family Business Owner: Use of Domestic and Offshore
Strategies and Entities to Legally Maximize the Preservation of Wealth for Family
Business Owners and Family Members, SM003 ALI-ABA 1359 (July 19-21, 2006)
(discussing different asset protection strategies); http://www.assetprotection
book.com/family-limited-partnerships.htm (providing information concerning
Family Limited Partnerships); http://www.rjmintz.com (discussing a range of as-
set protection strategies).
195. The insolvent debtor's creditor will bear the loss from his default whenever the
creditor cannot impute his liability to the other spouse.
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ing the couple's self-serving testimony. The effectiveness of creditors'
arguments depends upon the discretion of a court with no particular
legal expertise in marriage or divorce. The result is a swamp of deci-
sions, without consistent justification, in which no case offers useful
guidance for the next. To make matters even worse, individuals' con-
sumer debt and entrepreneurial risk levels continue to rise relative to
income. As the legal significance of marriage becomes increasingly
unpredictable, the stakes for creditors and their married debtors in
imputed liability cases are higher than ever.
As states adopt domestic partnership laws that extend marital lia-
bility and property regimes to registrants, creditors will call upon
courts to impute liability from one domestic partner to the other.19 6
Just as imputed liability cases identify reasonable behavior within
marriage, cases alleging imputed liability between domestic partners
will define the scope of shared domestic partnership liability and a
critical aspect of what it means to adopt the legal status of domestic
partner. As domestic partnership evolves as a social phenomenon,
courts will reveal the archetype of reasonable domestic partner behav-
ior, and the level of trust and deference within domestic partnerships
that is "just what domestic partners should do." Courts, not sweeping
legislative initiatives, will define in each case the social value of in-
vestment in domestic partnerships relative to creditors' rights. At the
same time, they will determine the social value of domestic partner-
ships relative to the tradition of marriage.
V. CONCLUSION
Although marriage has changed from a legal status to a custom-
ized private relationship between spouses, change in marital agency
has taken its own pace. Courts continue to differentiate between ordi-
nary marital collaboration and partnership or agency between people
who, coincidentally, happen to be married. While commentators de-
bate who may marry and the optimal legal regulation of divorce,
courts define, without fanfare, the legal effect of a person's marriage
on his creditors and the relative social value of marriage as a collabo-
rative form.
196. See generally 2003 Cal. Stat. 421 § 15 (2003) (provisions of the Domestic Partner-
ship Act "shall be construed liberally in order to secure to eligible couples the full
range of legal rights, protections and benefits, as well as all of the responsibili-
ties, obligations and duties to each other, to their children, to third parties and to
the state, as the law of California extend to and impose upon spouses"); Robert F.
Kidd & Frederick C. Hertz, Partnered in Debt: The Impacts of California's New
Registered Domestic Partner Law on Creditors' Remedies and Debtors' Rights
Under California Law and Under Federal Bankruptcy Law, 28 CAL. BANKR. J.
148 (2006).
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